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AD NUMBER	
AD509060	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
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FROM:	confidential
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AUTHORITY	
OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

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AGDA (M) (6 May 70)

FOR OT UT 701235

19 May 1970

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)**

AD 509060

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period  
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities (Reference: Map, 1:50,000,  
VN Series L7014).

a. Introduction.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division continued in the performance of its general missions during the reporting period:

(a) Destruction of main force North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units, equipment and base camps.

(b) In conjunction with Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces, the identification and destruction of local Communist forces and the Communist infrastructure (VCI) in order to provide a secure environment to further GVN authority over the area and people.

(c) Assistance in the training and improvement of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and GVN forces.

(d) Overwatch of the Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).

(e) Preparations to redeploy the 1st Infantry Division from the Republic of Vietnam to CONUS.

(2) Within the overall framework of these general missions, the principal missions for the reporting period were to:

(a) Detect and destroy enemy forces approaching Saigon through the Dau Tieng - Saigon River - Iron Triangle and Song Be - Dong Nai - Tan Uyen Zones.

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(b) In coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, and the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions, conduct attrition operations against Communist Sub-region 1 (SR-1) and the 101st Regiment.

(c) In coordination with the 5th ARVN Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), conduct attrition operations against Communist Sub-region 5 (SR-5) and the Dong Nai Regiment.

(d) From January 1970, in coordination with the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF), conduct attrition operations in Phuoc Tuy Province against elements of Communist Sub-region 4 (SR-4) and the 274th Regiment.

(e) Support GVN Revolutionary Development Program by conducting military operations within the TAOI in coordination with and in support of the 5th ARVN Division, and respective province and district headquarters.

(f) Continue implementation of "Vietnamization" through operations with the 5th ARVN Division and other GVN military forces in the TAOI under the Dong Tien or "Progress Together" Program.

(g) Maintain security of major lines of communications within the TAOI (Hwy 13 - Rt Iron; Hwy 314 and 16 - Rt Lead; and Hwy 7B, 2A and 1A - Rt Zinc).

(h) Within the TAOI, coordinate the security of key bridges and installations, and respond to Communist/NVA attacks against Allied installations, camps and headquarters.

(i) Prepare detailed plans for the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from South Vietnam.

(j) Prepare detailed contingency plans for providing assistance to adjacent Allied units during the TET holiday period in February 1970.

(3) Based on command guidance, experience factors and the changing tactical environment, the following operational trends were prevalent during the reporting period.

- (a) Increased emphasis on maintaining contact.
- (b) Night operations.
- (c) Small unit operations.
- (d) "Pile-on" tactics.

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- (e) Village/hamlet seal and search operations.
- (f) Rallyer/PW interrogation and exploitation.
- (g) Centralization of divisional assets.
- (h) Major displacements of brigades, and combat and combat support units.
- (i) Combined operations with ARVN, Regional and Popular Force units (RF/PF) and People's Self-Defense Force units (PSDF) at battalion, company, battery and platoon levels.

b. Personnel and administration.

(1) Personnel strength:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Agg</u>
Authorized 1 Nov 69	1077	192	15926	17195
Authorized 31 Jan 70	1077	191	15919	17187
Assigned 1 Nov 69	1150	183	15884	17217
Assigned 31 Jan 70	1113	174	14857	16144

(2) Enlisted gains, qualification and status:

(a) Replacements received: 4088.

(b) Outstanding requisitions: as of 13 Jan 70, DA cancelled all previous requisitions that were valid for all enlisted grades. Therefore, this quarter had no shortfall of enlisted personnel.

(c) Credits: None.

(d) Qualifications: None.

(3) Officer gains, qualifications and status:

(a) Replacements received: 270.

(b) Outstanding requisitions: 0.

(c) Credits: N/A.

(d) Qualifications and status: N/A.

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(4) Enlisted losses: Administrative losses during the period include reassignment within RVN, rotation and ETS, and board actions:

(a) Reassignments within RVN: 370.

(b) Rotation and ETS: 4370.

(5) Officer and warrant officer losses: There were 324 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations and ETS.

(6) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

<u>Nov</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>Agg</u>
KIA	4	1	26	31
WIA	17	1	201	219
MIA	0	0	0	0
NBD	0	0	9	9
NBM	4	0	43	47

## Dec

KIA	0	0	14	14
WIA	10	0	141	151
MIA	0	0	0	0
NBD	0	0	8	8
NBM	2	0	42	44

## Jan

KIA	1	0	20	21
WIA	10	0	122	132
MIA	0	0	0	0
NBD	0	0	13	13
NBM	3	1	76	80

(7) Maintenance of morale: awards and decorations.

Medal of Honor	0
Distinguished Service Cross	0
Distinguished Service Medal	0
Silver Star	121
Soldier's Medal	17
Bronze Star Medal - Valor	572
Bronze Star Medal - Merit	4438
Army Commendation Medal - Valor	294

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Army Commendation Medal - Merit	6167
Legion of Merit	15
Distinguished Flying Cross - Valor	59
Distinguished Flying Cross - Achievement	18
Air Medal - Valor	76
Purple Heart	430
Air Medal - Achievement	4258
Certificate of Achievement	1

## (8) Personnel management:

(a) Infusion: During the period of 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70, the 1st Infantry Division was not involved in any infusion program.

(b) Evaluation: The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division caused USARV to cancel virtually all replacements to the division effective 13 Jan 70. As of this date all personnel efforts were concentrated on redeploying the division and making the best use of enlisted personnel resources in maintaining tactical operations throughout the redeployment period.

## c. Operations

### (1) General:

(a) On 1 November 1969, the 1st Infantry Division began operation TOAN THANG ("Complete Victory") Phase IV and continued its participation as of the close of the reporting period. All organic units and those under the operational control (OPCON) of the division were involved. General objectives were to maintain and expand the offensive-oriented protective "umbrella" in the northern and eastern portions of the division TAOI, support a vigorous pacification and security campaign in the populated areas of the TAOI and implement programs to upgrade local ARVN and GVN military units.

(b) Specific objectives included denying enemy base area utilization, interdicting Communist/NVA infiltration activities, disrupting enemy logistical operations, preparing for redeployment, exposing 5th ARVN Division units to extensive field operations and winning support for the GVN from the local population. Battlefield operations consisted of both unilateral and joint (US-ARVN-RF/PF) ground reconnaissance, night ambush, route security, PSYOP (psychological operations) and search and seal operations. In addition, extensive operations in conjunction with riverine forces were conducted along the Saigon, Thi Tinh and Song Be Rivers to interdict enemy traffic along these natural highways. Finally, in the pacification campaign, strong civic action (CIVAC) and PSYOP programs were combined with increased efforts to provide military security for the civilian population.

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## (2) Force disposition:

(a) During the reporting period, two significant boundary changes resulted in major adjustments of division force disposition. On 15 Dec 69, the 5th ARVN Division assumed responsibility for the remainder of the division's TAOR in southern Binh Duong Province. This included the Phu Hoa/Iron Triangle/Saigon River territory west of Ben Cat and the area east of Ben Cat to Highway LTL 16 and then south to Tan Uyen. Although responsibility for the defense of Di An (XT905058) and Phu Loi (XT858155) base camps remained with the 1st Infantry Division, the division was able to deploy the 2d Brigade north to Lai Khe (XT770380). At the same time the division's upper boundary was extended north to the 78 EW grid line and the 3d Brigade moved its headquarters to Minh Thanh (XT628661). This disposition lasted only until 4 Jan 70, when, on orders from II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV), the 2d Brigade moved from Lai Khe to Bear Cat, (YS167994), set up its rear headquarters and began operations southeast of Bear Cat in Phuoc Tuy Province.

(b) During the reporting period, the 1st Brigade employed one infantry battalion (1-2d Inf) in the Michelin Plantation/Razorback Mountain area, one mechanized battalion (2-2d Inf) in the Michelin and Trapezoid, and one US (2-28th Inf) and one ARVN (Dong Tien) infantry battalion in the Trapezoid. After 5 Jan 70, operational control of one US (1-28th Inf) and one ARVN (Dong Tien) infantry battalion operating in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone passed from the 3d Brigade to the 1st Brigade. Thus, during January 1970, the brigade employed six battalions (one mechanized, three infantry and two ARVN "Dong Tien") in the northwestern portion of the division TAOR. As in the previous period, the 1st Brigade continued to conduct offensive operations to detect and destroy Communist/NVA forces and caches, extensive ambush and riverine operations to interdict enemy infiltration and logistical operations, combined Dong Tien operations with ARVN/GVN military forces, and rice denial operations in the Saigon River villages south of Dau Tieng (XT495473).

(c) Until 5 Jan 70, the 2d Brigade continued to secure the southern portion of the TAOR with two infantry battalions (1-18th and 2-18th Inf) in close coordination with the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne, the 7th ARVN Regiment, 5th ARVN Division and Binh Duong Province forces. On 9 Nov 69 the divisional cavalry squadron became OPCON to the 2d Brigade, while on 15 Nov the 3-82d Airborne Brigade deployed from South Vietnam. Their former TAOR in the Phu Hoa and Iron Triangle was absorbed by the 7th ARVN Regiment with the 2d Brigade assuming overwatch responsibility. On 15 December 69, the brigade moved its headquarters from Di An to Lai Khe and subsequently employed two infantry battalions (2-18th and 1-26th Inf) in the Song Be Corridor, and one infantry battalion (1-18th Inf) and the divisional cavalry squadron (1-4th Cav) to the south, below Phu Giao (XT883399). Then, from 4-6 Jan 70,

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the brigade made its last displacement to Phuoc Tuy Province where it controlled one mechanized (1-16th Mech) and two infantry (2-16th and 2-18th Inf) battalions. General missions were to detect and destroy Communist/NVA forces, interdict enemy infiltration and logistical operations, conduct combined operations with ARVN/GVN military forces and support pacification through coordinated population and resource control operations.

(d) Until 15 Dec 69, the 3d Brigade employed five battalions (1-16th Mech, 2-16th, 1-26th and 1-28th Inf, and one ARVN Dong Tien infantry battalion) north of Lai Khe in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone (west of Route 13) and the Song Be Corridor (east of Route 13). From 15 Dec 69 to 4 Jan 70, the brigade relinquished one of its infantry battalions (1-26th Inf) to the 2d Brigade, and continued operations between the Michelin Plantation and Route 13 from its Minh Thanh headquarters. With the displacement of the 2d Brigade to Phuoc Tuy Province in January 1970, the 3d Brigade moved its headquarters back to Lai Khe and gave up part of its western area of operations (AO) to the 1st Brigade along with two infantry battalions (1-28th Inf and one ARVN Dong Tien battalion). While losing its other two battalions (2-16th Inf and 1-16th Mech), to the 2d Brigade, the 3d Brigade absorbed that brigade's former AO together with two infantry battalions (1-18th and 1-26th Inf) and the divisional cavalry squadron (1-4th Cav). Thus, at the close of the reporting period the 3d Brigade was employing three battalions (1-4th Cav, 1-18th and 1-26th Inf) in the northeastern portion of the division TAOI. During this period the missions of the brigade were to detect and destroy Communist/NVA forces and caches, interdict enemy infiltration and logistical operations, conduct combined "Dong Tien" operations with the 5th ARVN Division and secure convoys along Route 13.

## (3) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase IV.

(a) The concentration of divisional air and artillery assets in support of extensive small unit operations along historical enemy infiltration routes and base areas continued to isolate the enemy from the populated southern portions of the TAOI. Faced by more effective ARVN and GVN military forces, and continuous pressure from the 1st Infantry Division, enemy units remained in remote areas and continued to operate in small groups to avoid detection. The division maintained its network of interlocking fire support bases (FSB) and centralized its other support assets in order to employ them more effectively and efficiently. At the same time, small unit ground reconnaissance and night ambushes continued to be emphasized. Units of the 5th ARVN Division and local RF/PF units continued to participate in these small scale operations resulting in an even stronger Allied force density in critical areas.

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(b) With increased security, the pacification campaign proceeded rapidly in the populated regions of the central and southern TAOI. The 1st Infantry Division, 5th ARVN Division and Binh Duong Province forces continued their efforts against the dwindling VCI network and Communist local force units through systematic seal and search operations, centralization and coordination of intelligence data, rapid PW and Rallier exploitation, and the extensive use of Mobile Resource Control Teams.

(c) Known enemy units within the Division TAOI tried desperately to avoid contact and often devoted their entire efforts to food, equipment and personnel resupply. Resupply became their major mission. In order to conserve existing force levels, the enemy abstained from large-scale attacks against Allied installations. Combat ventures generally were limited to stand-off attacks by mortar and rocket fire.

(d) Intelligence reports did not indicate that the enemy intended to launch coordinated, large-scale attacks in February 1970 similar to the TET offensives of 1968 and 1969. Nevertheless, the division had five TLT Contingency plans prepared in the event it became necessary to assist the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), and 25th Infantry Division, the 5th ARVN Division/ Binh Duong Province or the Capital Military Assistance Command (CHAC) in the Saigon - Long Binh - Bien Hoa area.

#### (4) Operation "Danger Forward" Phase II:

(a) With the movement of the 2d Brigade north to Lai Khe on 15 Dec 69, Phase II of Operation Danger Forward was put into effect. The same principles and practices used in Phase I (see para 1c(5), a-j, 1st Infantry Division ORLL, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69) were applied. But with Phase II the boundary extensions to the north allowed Big Red One units to attack enemy troop concentrations and logistical bases when formerly had been located safely above the TAOI. It should be pointed out that the division was still geared for intensive, small-scale operations and, with the 5th ARVN Division's AO expanding in the south, was in a better position to put more pressure on these areas than the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

(b) In the Michelin Plantation area, the Trapezoid, the lower Song Be Corridor, and east and west of Route 16 (LTL 16), the decrease in both density and size of enemy units made it desirable to conduct decentralized platoon and squad-size operations. At this level, infantry units are able to cover more area and still obtain rapid assistance from supporting units. Two successful techniques used for such decentralized operations were the "Shotgun" technique and the "aerial assault ambush" (See

Incl 13, 1st Inf Div Cir 525-19, "Air Assault Ambush Flights" and Incl 14, "The Shotgun Technique of Area Saturation").

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(c) Another small unit technique used with considerable success was the "mechanical ambush." Essentially, this is a claymore mine (see Incl 15) used offensively. They proved extremely effective positioned in areas of suspected enemy activity that cannot be covered entirely by conventional ambushes or used to secure the flank or rear of ambush positions. From 15 Oct 69 to 31 Jan 70, mechanical ambushes accounted for over 160 enemy eliminated in the 1st Infantry Division TAOR.

## (5) Operation "Seminoles:"

(a) On 25 Oct 69, Operation Seminoles was launched with the objective of reducing the strength of specific enemy Local Force (LF) units by one third prior to 1 Jan 70. Each brigade and the cavalry squadron were given specific units against which to concentrate. Targeted were the C301 (Tan Uyen), C61 (Ben Cat), C62 (Chau Thanh), C63 (Lai Thieu), C64 (Dau Tieng) and C65 (Phu Cuong) LF companies. Though weak, these units were considered important to the enemy and their attrition was a significant step forward in the pacification campaign. In addition, with no major activity in the TAOR, the 1st Infantry Division could afford to target substantial resources against these local, semi-guerrilla units.

(b) During the reporting period the following results were achieved:

LF Unit	Strength	No. Elim in Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Total
C61	50	15	1	12	2	30
C62	45	4	0	3	0	7
C63	20	0	0	0	Not in div AO	0
C64	120	16	19	9	0	44
C65	25	16	0	0	Not in div AO	16
C301	85	9	0	1	0	10

The above figures are only rough estimates; more accurate strength data is available through IPW (Interrogation Prisoner-of-War) and captured document reports.

(c) Operation "Chameleon": On order from II Field Force Vietnam, Operation Chameleon began on 30 Dec 69. The operation involved the movement of the 2d Brigade out of the Division's TAOR to AO "Dagger" southeast of Bear Cat Base Camp (YS167994) in Phuoc Tuy Province. The brigade's mission was to increase the Allied force density, and assist the 1st Australian Task Force and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer force in combating enemy units, especially the 274th Main Force Regiment, the 5th Main Force Heavy Weapons Battalion of SR-4, the 525th and D67 Sapper Battalions and the C41 Local Force Company. From 5-31 Jan 70, the 2d Brigade accounted for 41 enemy KIA and 18 possible KIA. In addition, contacts and successes of the Australians and Thais slowly increased with the overall increase in Allied pressure.

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## (7) Rice denial operations:

(a) On 18 Nov 69, the 1st Infantry Division began an extensive rice denial program in Binh Duong Province. Since August 1969, intelligence reports had traced the disintegration of the enemy's logistical system. The bulk of his energy was being spent on resupply missions. However, his failure to replenish his foodstocks was continually reflected in the stream of Ralliers who had surrendered out of desperation. In order to keep the enemy in this unfavorable posture, the post-monsoon rice harvest had to be protected.

(b) A coordinated G2-G3 effort was necessary to produce a body of relevant information on crop harvesting and marketing areas and procedures. This was then correlated with known enemy strengths, locations and past activities. To avoid duplication of effort, both the 5th ARVN Division and Binh Duong Province officials were brought into the planning early. After a rice harvest intelligence picture had been projected, three rice zones were designated and enough troop resources allocated to insure security and control of the harvesting, processing, transporting and marketing of the rice crop. Direct supervision was accomplished by local GVN officials. Though difficult to measure the program's success, the inability of the enemy to rebuild his logistical base during the reporting period and his subsequent inaction, indicates the program achieved its goals.

(8) Operation "Keystone Bluejay": Planning for Keystone Bluejay, the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from the Republic of Vietnam, began officially on 15 Dec 69. On that date, the Commanding General received word that, after more than four years of combat, the 1st Infantry Division colors would return to CONUS before 15 April as part of the President's Phase III withdrawal. Plans outlined a four increment stand down of the division. The plan called for a small color guard to be returned to Fort Riley, Kansas, with the bulk of the division's personnel reassigned within Vietnam. A separate After Action Report applies to Keystone Bluejay.

## (9) Significant enemy initiated events.

(a) On the morning of 4 Nov 69, Dau Tieng Base Camp was struck by four 107mm rockets and 15 82mm mortar rounds slightly wounding three US personnel. Following this, at 0053 and 0158 two ground probes were launched against FSB Mons XIII (vic XT574386) with semi-automatic (SA) and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire. The brief contacts resulted in one Armored Personnel Carrier, one .50 cal. MG and one Rome Flow damaged. The following night, both Dau Tieng and Lai Khe base camps were subject to harassing rocket attacks with only minor damage. These four attacks may have been prompted by President Nixon's announced address to the US Nation concerning Vietnam, broadcast late on the morning of 4 Nov 69.

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(b) On 5 Nov 69, 2130, 20-25 enemy entered Dong Sac Village on Route 16 (vic XT902342) and kidnapped the girl friend of 237th RF Company Commander. The woman was later found murdered.

(c) Dau Tieng was again hit on 15 Nov 69, 0745, by four 107mm rockets resulting in six US WIA, one KIA and one helicopter damaged. The following day, the daily Dau Tieng-FSB Tennessee (vic XT583333) convoy was ambushed at 1050, vic XT532385. Several RPG rounds and SA fire resulted in light damage to the lead tank and one US slightly WIA.

(d) The last enemy initiated action for the month was on 30 Nov 69 when Dau Tieng received 20-25 122mm rockets (impacting outside the perimeter) at 0013, and four 107mm rockets at 0052. Later that morning, at 0130, FSB Pine Ridge to the north (XT522588) was hit by ten 82mm mortar rounds. The only casualty was one US slightly WIA at Dau Tieng.

(e) On the night of 2-3 Dec 69, indirect fire attacks were again absorbed by Lai Khe, Dau Tieng and FSB Pine Ridge. Dau Tieng received nine 107mm rockets and 40-60 rounds of 120mm mortar rounds resulting in five US WIA, and heavy damage to the 1-5 Arty mess. A second attack against Dau Tieng and those against Lai Khe and Pine Ridge were minor. On 7-8 Dec 69, four similar rocket/mortar attacks were launched against Dau Tieng and Pine Ridge. These harassing attacks were not followed by sapper assaults, ground probes or any other significant activity.

(f) After 3 Dec 69, these attacks began to decrease. However, with Communist holidays on 20 and 22 December (the anniversary of the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam's People's Army Day), and the Bob Hope Christmas Show scheduled for 22 December, extra patrols were scouring the Lai Khe "Rocket Belt." At 1800, 21 Dec 69, vic XT758459, A/2-16 surprised an enemy squad resulting in one PW (WIA), two KIA and three 107mm rockets (ready for launching at Lai Khe) captured. The enemy unit was later identified as a platoon of the C9, K35 Artillery Battalion.

(g) The last major fire attack against Dau Tieng and Pine Ridge took place on 4 Jan 70. At 0100, the 1st Brigade base camp took 25 120mm mortar rounds damaging six Cobra gunships and six utility helicopters. Following this at 0340, a 9-10 round mortar attack against Pine Ridge was executed, but failed to cause any damage. Due to inexperience or friendly activity, the enemy units harassing Pine Ridge never were able to place accurate fire against this FSB despite many attempts during the reporting period.

(h) A second terrorist incident occurred on 28 Jan 70. At 2215, approximately 10 enemy entered Binh My Village (vic XT905336), destroyed a building in the market place with a satchel charge and withdrew before the 57th FF Platoon could react. During the same night, nearby FSB Lobo (XT867372) and Tan Binh (XT879359) were hit at 1945 and 2015 by 82mm mortar fire. The suspected firing grid for both indirect attacks was XT9437.

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(i) The last major fire attack during the reporting period occurred on 301923 Jan 70 when Lai Khe was subject to 12 122mm rockets (suspected firing areas were XT740487 and XT747492). Only three rockets landed inside the perimeter resulting in one building damaged and one US slightly wounded.

(10) Significant events: As in the previous period, the bulk of the division's combat activities consisted of small unit operations and engagements with groups of 3-4 enemy troops.

(a) On 31 Oct 69, A/1-2d Inf located a large medical cache between the Michelin Plantation and Minh Thanh (vic XT567635). The cache consisted of both medical supplies (anti-toxins, blood, insulin, plasma, and a variety of drugs in liquid and solid form) and medical equipment (stoves, pans, tape, scissors, bandages, clamps, etc). The size and variety of the find indicated that the enemy had planned to establish a well-equipped field hospital somewhere in the general area.

(b) On the morning of 11 Nov 69, a platoon of A/1-18th Inf laying in ambush just south of the Song Be River, vic XT980383, sighted 35-40 enemy on the bank. At 0625, the ambushers opened fire at close range, quickly killing 19 enemy and securing six PW. The remaining enemy returned fire and fled to the southeast. There were no friendly casualties.

(c) A group of seven ralliers surrendered to B/2-28th Inf on 160925 69 vic XT519409. Interrogations revealed that these were the last of the Ben Tran Guerillas (the others had rallied on 23 Sep 69).

(d) The only heavy action in the Trapezoid took place on 23 Nov 69. At 0920, vic XT556441, A/2-28th Inf engaged an estimated 20-25 enemy. The enemy was well dug-in and returned with SA/RPG/automatic weapons (AW) fire. The infantry was momentarily stopped with 10 WIA. The company was quickly supported by D/1-4th Cav gunships and fighter-bombers (TAC Air) and later reinforced by C/2-28th Inf, and four APC's from Recon/2-2d Inf (Mech). At 1730, elements of C/2-28th Inf and Recon/2-2d (Mech) re-established contact and drove the enemy from the area. Final results of the day-long contact were 16 US WIA and 30 enemy KIA; one 81mm mortar and a quantity of individual weapons, ammunition and documents captured.

(e) On 26 Nov 69, at 1030 vic XT887118 (just outside Di An Base Camp), B/1-4th Cav operating with the 169th RF Company destroyed a tunnel, killing three enemy soldiers. Documents of one of the enemy KIA identified him as Chief of Staff of the Dong Nai Regiment.

(f) On 20 Dec 69, B/2-2d Inf (Mech) while checking a Yellow Jacket report (suspected enemy headquarters location), spotted a radio antenna attached to a tree. The antenna wire led to a carefully concealed spider hole. A guard was immediately killed and 12 PW were talked out of the

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tunnel by a Kit Carson Scout. A search of the underground shelter revealed: one AK-47, two pistols, eight Sony transistor radios, one Chi Com #139 receiver C/W voice, three PRC 25 radios, one homemade AM receiver, two homemade AM transmitter/receivers, and a quantity of maps, documents and miscellaneous equipment. Documents included unit locations for 3-82d Abn battalions (then redeployed from RVN), and the call signs and frequencies of all 1st Infantry Division battalions and those of the 3-82d Abn down to the company level. Although the PW were evasive and uncooperative during interrogation, the large volume of SOI data and transcripts of friendly radio traffic (especially Binh Duong Province nets) indicated that the facility was a radio intercept station of the Intelligence Section, Military Affairs Branch, SR-1.

(11) Target destruction section (TDS): The TDS continued to improve its efficiency during the reporting period and, as of 31 Jan 70, its assisted in the elimination of 190 enemy (see para 1c(11)(a), 1st Infantry Division ORLL, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69).

(12) Night Hawks: During the reporting period, Night Hawk operations resulted in 89 engagements with 95 enemy KIA and three sampans destroyed (for more information, see para 1c(11)(b), 1st Infantry Division ORLL, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69).

(13) USAF support: There were 1353 sorties of Tac Air in support of the 1st Infantry Division during the period 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70. In addition, there were six B-52 strikes, one in the Trapezoid, two in the Song Be Corridor, and three in the vicinity of the Michelin Plantation. Four landing zones were constructed using Commando Vaults, two in the eastern Catcher's Mitt area and two east of the Razorback.

(14) The cumulative results for Operation TOAN THANG, Phase IV, which began on 1 Nov 69 and continued as of 31 Jan were:

(a) US: 65 KIA and 460 MIA; one dump truck, one PRC-25, one Zippo (APC with flamethrower), one UH-1 helicopter destroyed and one scout dog KIA.

(b) Enemy: 1017 KIA, 68 possible KIA, 96 PW, 114 Hoi Chanhs (Ralliers) and 134 detainees; 612 individual weapons; 57 crew-served weapons; 102,225 SA rounds; 2,351 grenades; 710 RPG rounds; 416 mortar rounds; four 75mm R/R rounds; one 90mm round; seven 155mm rounds; one 8" round; 19 2.75" rockets; 14 107mm rockets; one 122mm rocket; 255 AP mines; 72 AT mines; 324 lbs of explosives; 1078 blasting caps; 4,135 bunkers; 24 bicycles; 53 sampans; and 17,125 lbs of rice captured or destroyed.

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(15) Statistical summary:

	<u>US KIA</u>	<u>NVA KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>	<u>Total Enemy Eliminated</u>
November 69	30	365	42	27	434
December 69	14	330	46	82	452
January 70	21	322	8	5	335

(b) Monthly ratios:

	<u>Kill Ratio</u>	<u>Elimination Ratio</u>
November 69	365:30 12.2:1	434:30 14.5:1
December 69	330:14 23.7:1	452:14 32.7:1
January 70	322:21 15.3:1	335:21 16:1

(16) Land clearing operations:

(a) The division Rome plows began the reporting period near FSB Son, vic XT640350. From 1 Nov through 9 Nov 69 they cut 240 acres followed by a six-day maintenance stand down. On 17 Nov 69 they moved northeast of the Michelin, vic XT7056, to conduct offensive clearing operations and, through 5 Dec 69, cut 531 acres. On 6 Dec 69, the plows moved to the upper Song Be Corridor, vic XT842667, until 15 Dec 69 and cut 269 acres. Following a maintenance stand down at Lai Khe, the plows moved into the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, vic XT618554, and cleared 335 acres. On 5 Jan 70, the plows moved into the Trapezoid and, by 31 Jan, had cut 923 acres. During this three-month period, the 1st Engineer Rome Plows cleared a total of 2298 acres in the division TAOR.

(b) The 984th Land Clearing Company began this reporting period in the Trapezoid, vic XT556396 and XT621348. From 1 Nov to 16 Nov 69, they cut 2840 acres before moving out of the division AO.

(17) Operation Dong Tien: From Nov 69 to Jan 70 the Dong Tien program continued to stress dual US/ARVN infantry battalion operations. As before, the program involved the "association" of similar US/ARVN units; this association did not imply an OPCON status and participating ARVN forces remained under the control of their parent unit (see lc(19), 1st Infantry Division ORLL 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69).

(a) Battalions of the 8th ARVN Regiment continued to work with the 1-28th and 2-28th Inf at Fire Support Bases Apollo (XT637507) and Kien (XT519418). At Kien, the 3-8th ARVN Inf continued to operate with the 2-28th Inf until it

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was relieved on 11 Jan by the 2-8th. At Apollo, the 1-8th replaced the 2-8th ARVN Inf on 12 Dec 69. As in the previous reporting period, both US infantry battalions shared the fire support base with their ARVN counterparts and operated combined tactical operations centers. Combined operations were characterized by dual US/ARVN company operations, cross-attached platoon operations, and decentralized field operations which have stressed small unit leadership and employment of combat support assets.

(b) Until 15 Dec 69, the 2-7th ARVN Inf at FSB Jim (XT882392) continued to conduct coordinated operations with the 1-18th Inf at FSB Normandy III (XT904318). South of Normandy III, the 2-18th Inf at FSB Venable Heights (XT902176) was paired first with the 4-7th ARVN Inf and, after 9 Dec 69, with the 3-7th. These units did not share fire support bases or TOC; their Dong Tien program consisted mainly of coordinated planning and intelligence exploitation, and dual ARVN/US company operations. The two US infantry battalions also coordinated closely and conducted combined operations with local RF/PF. With the displacement of the 2d Brigade to Lai Khe on 15 Dec, the period of Dong Tien infantry operations with the 7th ARVN Regt was concluded.

(c) Combined operations under the Dong Tien program were not confined to US/ARVN infantry battalions. Since 1 Nov 69 the 1st Infantry Division conducted a total of 97 significant combined operations with RF/PF and PSDF units. In November and December, the mainstay of this effort was the 1-4th Cav operating in western and southwestern Binh Duong Province. Using their organic communications, mobility and firepower, the cavalry squadron was able to support four to five different GVN units at one time. In January 1970, the bulk of such operations was assumed by the 1-2d Inf (with units in Tri Tam District) and the 1-16th Inf (Mech) (in Phuoc Tuy Province). At the same time the 1-4th Cav, operating in the division's central and new southern TAOR, began conducting combined Dong Tien operations with 5th ARVN Division elements.

(d) On 28 Nov 69, A Battery, 51st ARVN Arty, was replaced by B/51st ARVN Arty at FSB Kien. A team from the 1st Infantry Division's 1-5th Arty was charged with training the new battery in US fire support procedures. In addition, the 1-7th Arty continued to provide assistance to B/181st ARVN Arty and the 2-33d Arty concentrated on providing radar (AN/PQR-4) OJT to selected ARVN personnel. Operational commitments of both US and ARVN units have prevented further expansion of the artillery Dong Tien program.

(e) Pacification support responsibility in southern and central Binh Duong Province was transferred to the 5th ARVN Division. With the improvement of local RF/PF and PSDF, ARVN units slowly moved north to reinforce and finally replace the combat forces of the 1st Infantry Division. By April, with the assistance of the 25th Infantry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry

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Regiment, and sufficient combat support from III Corps/II FFORCEV, 5th ARVN Division will be able to secure the Phu Hoa/Iron Triangle/Trapezoid/Route 13/Song Be Corridor area.

d. Training:

(1) Replacement training:

(a) There were 4812 replacements trained by the division school during the reporting period.

(b) Since the school opened on 15 Feb 69, there were 19,448 replacements trained.

(2) Sniper training:

(a) During the reporting period the following 18-day sniper classes were conducted:

<u>Class No.</u>	<u>Start/End Date</u>	<u>No. Snipers Graduated</u>
7-69	29 Oct - 16 Nov	18
8-69	20 Nov - 13 Dec	17
9-69	15 Dec - 5 Jan	17
1-70	8 Jan - 26 Jan	21

(b) 1st Infantry Division snipers eliminated 14 Communist/NVA during the three month period.

(c) Total body count as of 31 Jan 70: 71 KIA.

(d) As of 31 Jan 70, the 1st Infantry Division had 92 snipers deployed in the field.

(3) Division Mobile Training Team (MTT): The following training was conducted by the MTT during this period:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Students</u>	<u>Hours of Instruction</u>	<u>Man Hours</u>
Nov	7629	361	27,286
Dec	8054	373	30,300
Jan	8710	391	34,100

(4) Kit Carson Scout Training: There were 14 scouts trained by the Division Training Command during the reporting period.

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(5) TDY schools:

<u>Course</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Students</u>
MACV Recondo	Nha Trang	25
AARTS	Vung Tau	20
AH-1C	Vung Tau	2
OH-6A IP/SIP	Vung Tau	1
Signal	Long Binh	42
JEST	Republic of Philippines	7
PLL	Long Binh	14
Audio-visual	Long Binh	10
NCR 500	Long Binh	3

e. Intelligence.

(1) The strengths of enemy forces operating in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI as of 31 Jan 70 were estimated as follows:

Main force military personnel	3035
<u>Local force and guerrilla personnel</u>	<u>750</u>
Total estimated combat strength	3785
Logistical support personnel	<u>675</u>
Total strength	4460

(2) The known rate of infiltration appeared to have been inadequate to maintain enemy strength in the division TAOI. Known infiltration into the area decreased during November, December and January. Exact figures for infiltration into the 1st Infantry Division TAOI are not known, but do not exceed 400.

(3) Specific reinforcements available from outside the division TAOI were from the 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions. All units within the division TAOI had artillery units in support.

(4) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the division TAOI and along its periphery were:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Combat Effectiveness</u>	<u>Current Probable Location</u>
SR-1			
101 Regt	850	C/E	Trapezoid/N of Michelin
268 Regt	600	C/E	Ho Bo/Boi Loi area
Quyet Thang I & II Bns	170	Marginal C/E	Filhol/Phu Hoa area

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8th Arty Bn	90	Marginal C/E	Ho Bo/Citadel area
9th Arty Bn	100	C/E	Southern Trap/Phu Hoa
10th Arty Bn	80	Marginal C/E	Southern Trap/Filhol
 <u>SR-5</u>			
Dong Nai Regt	500	Marginal C/E	Song Be Corridor/ Catcher's Mitt
 <u>69 Arty CMD</u>			
96th Arty Regt	700	C/E	Dispersed through N III CTZ
K33 Arty Bn	200	C/E	N of Phuoc Vinh
K34 Arty Bn	200	C/E	N of Tay Ninh City
K35 Arty Bn	160	C/E	Long Nguyen/Michelin area
74 Arty Regt	625	C/E	War Zone D/Bien Hoa area (P)
 <u>Local Force Units</u>			
C61 Ben Cat Co	25	Marginal C/E	Dispersed along Thi Tinh River
C62 Chan Thanh Co	30	Marginal C/E	SE of Chanh Luu
C63 Lai Thieu Co	20	C/E	N of Lai Thieu
C64 Dau Tieng Co	69	C/E	Michelin
C65 Phu Cuong City Plat	8	Marginal C/E	N of Phu Cuong
C301	75	Marginal C/E	NE of Tan Uyen
C10	5	Marginal C/E	Phu Hoa Dong
C25	20	C/E	Filhol/Phu Hoa area
 <u>Rear Service Groups</u>			
81st RSG elements	300	N/A	War Zone D
83d RSG elements	500	N/A	SR-1
50th RSG elements	150	N/A	S of the Fishhook
 <u>SR-4/MR-7</u>			
274 Regt	750	C/E	S of Binh Son
D67 Bn	120	C/E	YS2970
525th Bn	140	C/E	Hat Dich
SR-4 MF Bns	470	C/E	Nhon Trach/Hat Dic
D440 LF Bn	200	C/E	YS4075
C41 Chau Duc Co	30	C/E	Chau Duc District (VC) and Toc Tien Mountain

(5) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units considered available as reinforcements are:

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Combat Effectiveness</u>	<u>Current Probable Location</u>
<u>5th Communist Division</u>	4000	C/E	
174 Regt	950	C/E	NE of Bunard
275 Regt	650	C/E	NE of Song Be
<u>7th NVA Division</u>	4325	C/E	
141 Regt	900	C/E	NW of Loc Ninh
165 Regt	950	C/E	SW of Bu Dop
209 Regt	925	C/E	NE of Loc Ninh
<u>9th Communist Division</u>	4000	C/E	
271 Regt	760	C/E	Eastern War Zone C
272 Regt	980	C/E	Western War Zone C
950 Regt	885	C/E	E of Bek Klok

## (6) 101st Regiment

(a) During the reporting period, the 101st Regiment continued to avoid contact while moving its three battalions northward. Near the end of the reporting period the regiment was involved in resupplying and refitting, and received approximately 140-160 known replacements which boosted its strength from approximately 700 to 850. The headquarters and rest base areas of the regiment were contacted numerous times from December 1969 to mid-January 1970 in the vicinity south of Minh Thanh (XT5962). However, the regiment continued to have difficulties with rice resupply and suffered severe food shortages due to allied operations in the Minh Thanh and Trapezoid areas.

(b) The K1 battalion relocated from east/northeast of the Michelin Plantation to the area directly north of the Michelin. The K2 battalion relocated from the central to the northern Trapezoid area while the K3 battalion moved from east/southeast to east/northeast of the Michelin.

(7) Dong Nai Regiment: The Dong Nai Regiment continued to avoid contact while attempting to solve its logistical problems. The only major relocation was the movement of the regimental headquarters from east of Chon Thanh in early December to northwest of Phuoc Hoa in late January. Reports during this period indicated that the Dong Nai Regiment no longer would perform the missions of a main force unit due to inadequate planning and poor leadership, and was capable of performing only the tasks normally reserved for local force companies. The strength of the regiment is presently held at 550 men. Another item of importance was the re-subordination of the K3 battalion directly to SR-5, leaving the Dong Nai with only three battalions. Main areas of concentration for the Dong Nai Regiment were in the

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Song Be Corridor, the Chanh Luu - Hoa Loi area, and north of Tan Uyen in the  
Catcher's Mitt.

(8) K35 Artillery Battalion.

(a) During the reporting period, the K35 Arty Battalion remained in the Long Nguyen/Michelin area, and continued its attacks against Lai Khe and Dau Tieng. There were several indications from PW and ralliers that the K35 was also experiencing food and munitions shortages. However, these problems did not severely hinder the battalion's ability to rocket and mortar its two main objectives (Lai Khe and Dau Tieng Base Camps). The strength of K35 decreased slightly during the latter part of 1969 from 200 to approximately 160.

(b) There is no evidence that K35 changed its AO or methods of operation. It was believed that the battalion would continue harassing attacks in the Dau Tieng and Lai Khe areas.

(9) C61 Local Force Company.

(a) Since the beginning of November, the C61 Local Force Company and related Ben Cat elements yielded 21 ralliers, four PW and 10 KIA (about 12 more KIA may possibly belong to these units). Food and supplies remained scarce during the reporting period and hunger was the chief reason for rallying. The strength of C61 was reduced during the three-month period from 35 men to 25 or less. The C3 Lai Khe Platoon was reduced to about 12 men, and the C4 men's mortar platoon from 20 to 10 men. The C5 women's platoon may have been disbanded and 10 of its members attached to C4, while four others were sent to other Ben Cat units.

(b) Offensive activity conducted during the reporting period by Ben Cat units included numerous mining incidents, booby-trapping, two terrorist acts against Ben Cat hamlets, three mortar attacks against Ben Cat, several sniping incidents and some proselytizing activities.

(c) All Ben Cat units were dispersed throughout the normal Ben Cat AO in 3-5 man cells. This strategy limited losses in any one contact with Allied forces, but made regrouping for offensive activity difficult. Total strength of Ben Cat elements, including both combatant and noncombatant units, is believed to have been between 180 and 200 personnel. Despite constant attrition over the past six months, Ben Cat forces were still believed capable of limited offensive activity, i.e., mining, booby trap and terrorist actions. But the two complete 82mm mortar tubes captured on 25 and 29 January, as well as a 75mm recoilless rifle captured on 1 Feb 70 may have eliminated the C4 Mortar Platoon's ability to shell Ben Cat.

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## (10) C64 Local Force Company.

(a) During the reporting period, C64 continued its harassing attacks on Dau Tieng and FSB Pine Ridge. Due to Allied operations in the Michelin area, elements of C64 experienced morale and food problems and munitions shortages. However, C64, like artillery units in the area, remained combat effective.

(b) C64 continued to remain in the Michelin area and, although its elements moved periodically within the Michelin, no major AO change occurred. At the end of the reporting period C64 was carried at a strength of approximately 69 personnel. Expectations were that C64 would probably continue its attacks on Dau Tieng and Pine Ridge as well as support main force units in the Michelin area.

(11) Rear Service Group (RSG) - 83: RSG-83 continued resupply activity in SR-1 in an attempt to alleviate their severe food shortage. The heaviest contact and identifications with RSG-83 were in and around the Trapezoid, where the group continually tried to bring supplies up from the south. RSG-83 was also attempting to obtain rice and other food supplies from RSG-50 operating north of the Michelin. RSG-83 was not capable of performing its mission, and combat units were forced to engage in their own resupply activities.

## f. Logistics.

(1) The division continued to install belly armor kits on armored personnel carriers to afford greater protection to the vehicles and occupants. By 10 Dec 69, all 110 kits initially given to the division were installed. On 15 January 1970, the division received an additional allocation of 122 kits. As of 31 Jan 70, a total of 178 kits had been installed.

(2) The weekly "free - no questions asked - turn-in" of excess equipment continued to be a successful operation. One unexpected problem had arisen - some units failed to inspect equipment thoroughly prior to turn-in. As a result, trash, ammunition items and explosive components were found among the items turned in. Commanders were reminded that Class V items will be turned in through ammunition channels and trash to the sanitary fill.

(3) The SLAT (Supply and Logistics Assistance Team) continued normal supply and logistical assistance visits in addition to their scheduled inspections with the IG until 10 Jan 70. On that date they began to audit property books in preparation for units turning in equipment for redeployment. These inspections insure that proper accountability for equipment is kept and that supply documentation procedures are being followed.

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(4) With the announcement of the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, implementation of planning for early turn-in of equipment that was not mission essential was begun on 20 Jan 70. This early turn-in policy was considered essential to complete the proper turn-in of all equipment by early April. By 31 Jan 70 the division had turned in 7% of its major end items.

g. Organization: Several organizational changes took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(1) 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 791, 19 Jan 70, detached the following units from 3d Bde, 1st Infantry Division: 1-16th Inf (Mech), 2-16th Inf and 1-28th Inf. The detachments were effective 5 Jan 70.

(2) The 1-16th Inf (Mech) and 2-16th Inf were attached to 2d Bde, 1st Infantry Division, effective 5 Jan 70 by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 794, 19 Jan 70.

(3) Attachment of the 1-28th Inf to 1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division, effective 5 Jan 70, was directed by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 793, 19 Jan 70.

(4) The 1st Bn, 18th Inf was detached from 2d Bde, 1st Infantry Division by General Order Number 792, 19 Jan 70, with an effective date of 5 Jan 70. Attachment of the same unit to 3d Bde, 1st Infantry Division, was directed by 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 795, 19 Jan 70.

(5) The 269th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) was released from 1st Infantry Division control on 12 Jan 70 as directed by II FFORCEV Conf Msg 120524, DTG 310140Z Dec 69.

(6) Battery A/5-2d Arty and the 1st Platoon, Battery I, 29th Arty were placed in general support status for the 1st Infantry Division on 18 Dec 69 as directed by II FFORCEV Conf Msg 120200, DTG 151445Z Dec 69.

h. Pacification campaign.

(1) Pacification objectives: During the reporting period steady pacification progress was made in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI. At the beginning of the reporting period, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) report indicated that 99% of the population in the division TAOI lived in A, B or C hamlets (HES Security Rating). This percentage remained constant during the three-month period. The HES reports also show that the number of people living in A or B hamlets remained between 66% and 68% of the total population in the division TAOI.

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## (2) Disposition of units:

(a) During the reporting period, the battalions of the 2d Brigade were repositioned to the south in Phuoc Tuy Province. This assistance was requested by Phuoc Tuy Province and approved for a 60-day period. Pacification over-watch responsibility for the hamlets was not assumed due to the limited time available. However, combined operations were conducted with RF/PF units located in Phuoc Tuy Province. The division TAOR/TAOI was reduced in the northwest and north (Chon Thanh) to compensate for the move of the 2d Brigade.

(b) On 1 Dec 69, a significant boundary change occurred between two districts in Binh Duong Province. The northern boundary of Chau Thanh District originally included Hoa Loi Village. During 1969, Ben Cat District annexed the village and the Ben Cat-Chau Thanh border was adjusted. On 1 Dec 69, Hoa Loi Village was returned to Chau Thanh District.

(3) Territorial security: RF/PF, PSDF and Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre continued to be prime targets for enemy terrorist activities. Ben Cat District experienced an increase in the number of terrorist incidents during November and, during January 1970, terrorist activity increased in Phu Giao District. Two National Policemen were killed, small groups of the enemy entered the hamlets on several occasions to obtain rice and the PSDF leader in Tan Binh Hamlet (XT8636) disappeared on 15 Jan 70. In Phu Hoa District, a former PSDF leader was assassinated. There were no hamlet security regressions in the division TAOI despite these isolated incidents. The territorial security posture remained relatively unchanged with only minor fluctuations in the HES Ratings.

## (4) Status of RF/PF and PSDF:

(a) There were 35 RF companies and 131 PF platoons operating in the division TAOI. Efforts were made by GVN to upgrade the performance of the RF companies by conducting leadership classes for RF company commanders at the Vietnamese Infantry School, Thu Duc. At the conclusion of this training cycle, officers of other RF units will be selected to attend similar classes.

(b) US-RF/PF combined operations were emphasized. Forty-one combined operations were conducted in Nov 69, 17 in Dec 69 and 39 in Jan 70. During the period, 18 different RF companies conducted combined operations with the 1st Infantry Division.

(c) The total number of PSDF units organized, trained and armed, exceeded the goals established by GVN for 1969. The totals reached 46,439 organized, 32,315 trained and 5601 armed. During January, a province-wide PSDF rally was held, and efforts were made by RD Cadre and RF companies to continue the training of the PSDF.

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(5) Future problem areas: The relocation of Ben Chua Hamlet (XT5536) is scheduled to occur prior to June 1970. People living in the southern portion of the hamlet will be moved to the north near Co Trach (XT5238). Both hamlet perimeters will be reduced and any families living outside of the new boundaries will be moved into the hamlets. The hamlet boundaries of Suoi Dua (XT5044) and Ben Tranh (XT5241) will also be adjusted and it is anticipated that some will be moved to new areas inside their perimeters. The following table shows the HES security status of the four hamlets in Thanh An Village, Tri Tam District, during November and December 1969:

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Suoi Dau	D	C
Ben Tranh	D	C
Co Trach	VC	VC
Ben Chua	VC	VC

(6) Statistical summary: The following is a statistical summary of the pacification status of the population within the division TAOI during November and December, 1969.

(a) As of 30 Nov 69:

<u>District</u>	<u>AB</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lai Thieu	37082	887			37969
Chau Thanh	101850	16871			118721
Ben Cat	13849	8142			21991
Tri Tam	9730	1637	613	2652	14632
Phu Hoa	5223	18729			23952
Phu Giao	612	5659			6271
Tan Uyen	13421	2983			16404
Di An	32890	7579			40469
Chon Thanh	10951	410			11361
<b>Totals</b>	<b>225608</b>	<b>62897</b>	<b>613</b>	<b>2652</b>	<b>291770</b>

Population in A, B, C: 99%.

Population in A and B: 77.4%.

(b) As of 31 Dec 69:

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<u>District</u>	<u>AB</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>DE</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lai Thieu	37969				37969
Chau Thanh	101850	16871			118721
Ben Cat	9708	12283			21991
Tri Tam	9730	1637	613	2652	14632
Phu Hoa	5223	18729			23952
Phu Giao	612	5659			6271
Tan Uyen	11642	4762			16404
Di An	32890	7579			40469
Chon Thanh	11361				11361
Totals	220985	67520	613	2652	291770

Population in A, B, C: 99%.

Population in A and B: 76%.

1. Psychological operations.

(1) Psychological operations this quarter were aimed at five main target groups:

- (a) Civilians.
- (b) Families of local Communist (VC).
- (c) Communist (VC) guerrillas and VCI.
- (d) Local force units.
- (e) NVA.

(2) During the quarter a total of 25,065,000 leaflets were disseminated and 1,362:35 hours of loudspeaker broadcast were employed in support of the division. The following is a breakdown, by unit, of support operations.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Broadcast Time</u>
1st Bde	6,229,000	410:05
2d Bde	9,567,000	345:30
3d Bde	9,269,000	607:00
Total	25,065,000	1,362:35

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## J. Civic action/civil affairs.

(1) During the past quarter, 5474 man days (10 hours per day) were devoted to civil affairs/civic action activities. Surplus or salvage military supplies donated for civic action projects were valued at 9,479,844 \$VN. Voluntary contributions totaled 172,311 \$VN, and 669,965 \$VN were used from the AIK Civic Action/Psy War Fund for civic action projects. The majority of the time, resources and monetary support were used on educational and social welfare projects, while the remaining funds and resources were used on economic development and transportation improvements.

(2) Thirty-four schools, 20 hospitals (dispensaries), 12 orphanages and one disaster relief program received assistance during the reporting quarter.

(3) Completed construction projects included two dwellings rebuilt, 16 kilometers of roads upgraded, and three churches, one dispensary, three schools and three bridges repaired.

(4) There were 73 English classes attended by 3,470 students, one nurse completed six weeks of nurse OJT training, 26 RF/PF medics completed a six-week first aid training program, and 434 MEDCAP/DENTCAP missions were conducted during which 30,654 patients were treated.

(5) Commodities distributed for self-help construction projects included 8265 lbs cement, 738 sheets tin, 3722 bd ft lumber, 305 gals paint, 70 lbs nails, 1500 ft electrical wire, 1700 bricks, 1238 health item kits, 28,957 lbs food and 570 lbs clothing.

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## 2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

### a. Personnel.

#### (1) Maintenance of Field Strength

(a) OBSERVATION: For successful unit tactical operations, an organization should maintain at least 80% of its assigned versus authorized strength in the command.

(b) EVALUATION: About 75 personnel are needed in an infantry rifle company to effectively conduct tactical missions. To maintain this strength, at least 75% of the personnel present for duty strength must be present in the field. Due to normal administrative and combat losses, action must be taken to maintain this figure for a combat effective posture. Actions should include, but need not be limited to, reduction of unit mortar platoons (units normally operate within multiple artillery fans thus reducing a constant need for organic mortar fire support), reviewing medical profiles and screening rear area personnel. In addition, unit policies should not permit personnel to return to the unit rear more than five days prior to DEROS, for the purpose of out-processing.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units use above methods to maintain 75% of their personnel present for duty in the field.

#### (2) Aviation Strength of Redeploying Units

(a) OBSERVATION: A loss of 33 aviators and the replacement of only 20 aviators caused an excess number of hours to be flown by 1st Aviation Battalion aviators.

(b) EVALUATION: No accidents or incidents were directly attributed to pilot fatigue during this reporting period. However, this may have been a contributing factor in one accident.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That authorized aviator strength of redeploying units be maintained until stand down.

#### (3) US Awards for RF/PF

(a) OBSERVATION: RF/PF units and personnel are not authorized US awards and decorations.

(b) EVALUATION: RF/PF units and personnel have frequently performed

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gallantly and with great distinction when operating with 1st Infantry Division units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That DA policy be changed to authorize US awards and decorations for RF/PF units and personnel.

## b. Intelligence.

### (1) Use of Intelligence Squads

(a) OBSERVATION: Much intelligence information is available within the populated areas adjacent to US units.

(b) EVALUATION: Many enemy related incidents occur within the hamlets and villages that go unreported for a variety of reasons or are reported too late to permit effective reaction. Many of the local civilians will not voluntarily report enemy incidents but usually are willing to talk when approached. The 1st Brigade has organized battalion intelligence squads that consist of an interpreter, two Kit Carson Scouts and two US personnel from S2 or the Reconnaissance Platoon. The intelligence squads visit the populated areas regularly, identify with the people and gain information. This system has provided valuable information concerning VCI, guerrilla and terrorist activities that might not otherwise have been reported.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That each battalion size unit operating within populated areas organize intelligence squads to make visits. The number of squads should be dependent upon the population density, security situation, personnel and equipment available and other tactical requirements. Each squad should be hand-picked, well motivated and dependable.

### (2) Spot Reports

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of a standardized checklist for intelligence spot reporting at battalion/brigade level improves the information made available and expedites the reporting system.

(b) EVALUATION: Reporting of complete and timely information can be a problem. This is particularly true when the reporting unit is in contact or otherwise actively engaged. The 1st Brigade has placed a checklist in unit TOC that covers the most significant types of incidents/situations. The person taking the report records the information and quickly checks to see that the report is complete. Initial reports are made the same way and completed whenever the situation permits. A simple checklist determines if all information required has been reported, expedites and standardizes the reporting system and increases the information made available for analysis. Having

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companies use the same checklist and report by referencing specific line numbers is the best system.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That units standardize spot reports down to the lowest level. Checklists should be used for contact, caches/finds, mines and booby traps, sightings and trail activity. They should be simple, logical and arranged to include essential information in a line format.

## c. Operations.

### (1) Shotgun Technique of Area Saturation (See Inclosure 14)

(a) OBSERVATION: To avoid detection, enemy units have broken up into groups of 2-5 men. The "shotgun," small unit ambush technique, was developed to trap these elusive groups by saturating a given area with small AP.

(b) EVALUATION: Shotgun operations are implemented by splitting an infantry company into six-man ambush teams, successively air assaulting them into separate locations and organizing them into a network of day and night AP. This allows the company to cover more area and increases its chances of making contact (see Incl 14 for complete description of technique and examples of employment).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units conduct shotgun or similar small unit operations to engage enemy units who seek to avoid contact by operating in small groups.

### (2) Employment of Mechanical Ambushes

(a) OBSERVATION: Infantry units cannot cover all likely areas of enemy movement at any one time. However, manned ambush positions can be successfully supplemented by "mechanical" ambushes.

(b) EVALUATION: One or more claymore mines, rigged to be detonated by trip wires, can effectively cover likely enemy areas of movement (see Incl 15). Such mechanical ambushes may be used as rear or flank security of manned AP, or placed in likely areas of enemy movement up to 1000 meters from the unit's location.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That infantry units employ claymore mines in an offensive role by placing mechanical ambushes in likely areas of enemy movement.

### (3) Employment of Mechanical Ambushes by Air Cav Troops

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(a) OBSERVATION: In areas where no ground troops are available to interdict known enemy activity, mechanical ambushes, quickly emplaced by air cav troops, have proven effective.

(b) EVALUATION: Just before dark, the division's aerorifle platoon is inserted after a quick artillery prep into an area of known enemy activity. One platoon section advances through the target area conducting a brief reconnaissance by fire and a hunter-killer team provides fires on both flanks of the section. Behind this cover, the remaining section emplaces several mechanical ambushes. The operation is completed quickly and the platoon extracted. At first light, a hunter-killer team is over the area, fixing any enemy elements who have activated the mines or who are waiting for daylight to detect and avoid the traps. As soon as possible, the aerorifle platoon is re-inserted to investigate. As the area is searched, the claymores are deactivated and removed. If no contact is made, the platoon is extracted. On 26-27 November 69, the first "aerial" mechanical ambush was emplaced in the southern Trapezoid (vic XT625436). Following a brief artillery prep, the aerorifle platoon was inserted at 1710 into a two-ship LZ. After a quick recon by fire, the claymores were emplaced and the platoon extracted. The next morning at 0755, a hunter-killer team on a visual reconnaissance mission of the area located one enemy killed by the claymores. The aerorifle platoon was inserted at 0836 and quickly located the enemy body and one carbine. The area was then searched, a small bunker complex discovered, and a second enemy soldier engaged and killed. A further search of the bunker yielded 30 lbs of rice, 10 uniforms and a quantity of documents.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above techniques be used to engage elusive enemy elements in areas not covered by ground troops.

## (4) Enemy Counter Mechanical Ambush Techniques

(a) OBSERVATION: A unit checking a mechanical ambush that had been detonated the night before observed and shot an NVA soldier who was attempting to throw a hand grenade.

(b) EVALUATION: As the use of mechanical ambushes continues, the enemy will develop counter ambush techniques. The fact that a claymore has detonated or that bodies lie in the kill zone does not eliminate the possibility of a counter ambush.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That troops be alerted to the possibility that the enemy will establish a counter ambush around a detonated mechanical ambush.

## (5) Ambush Techniques

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(a) OBSERVATION: The VC have recently been moving in stream beds to avoid US ambushes.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy is difficult to observe and engage when he is in a stream bed. The stream also provides him with a natural navigational aid. Personnel ambushing on trails that parallel streams may see the enemy but be unable to engage him directly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That personnel ambushing trails which parallel stream beds position claymores along the stream bed just above the water level.

## (6) Magnetic Effect of M57 Claymore Firing Device

(a) OBSERVATION: The electrical M57 firing device affects the lensatic compass.

(b) EVALUATION: The small unit leader who uses the compass normally controls the M57 firing device.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all small unit leaders be regularly reminded that different people should carry the compass and the M57 firing device.

## (7) Small Boat Operations SOP

(a) OBSERVATION: There are many procedures that personnel conducting small boat operations should be familiar with.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1st Engineer Battalion has developed three checklists for personnel working in boats: an operator's checklist, a Senior Infantryman's checklist and a passenger checklist (see Incl 3-5 of Incl 8, 1st Engr Battalion ORLL). The checklists outline duties and safety procedures.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all personnel engaged in small boat operations be familiar with and use these checklists.

## (8) Small Boat Formations

(a) OBSERVATION: Two formations are effective for patrolling rivers with small boats.

(b) EVALUATION: The file formation, with 75-100 meters between boats is best for rapid movement. Two columns, one on each bank of the river with 60-75 meters between boats, is best for deliberate movement. Further description of these formations is given in Incl 6 to Incl 8 (1st Engr Battalion ORLL).

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above formations be used for river patrol operations.

(9) Small Boat Ambush Formations

(a) OBSERVATION: Two formations have proven effective for establishing nighttime ambushes with small boats.

(b) EVALUATION: Two different ambush formations (see Incl 1 to Incl 8, 1st Engr Battalion ORLL) are used by the 1st Engineer Battalion. First, four boats are docked in a bend with two facing upstream and two facing downstream. Infantry are positioned on the near shore for security; a mechanical AP is set up on the opposite shore to prevent attack from that point. This formation provides coverage over a large area of the river and good internal lines of communication. The second method is to have eight to ten boats set up individual ambushes 50-100 meters apart. Shore security is put out from each boat and all the boats remain close enough to support each other. The complete formation covers from 500 to 1000 meters. The main advantage is the length of river which the boats control.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That these two ambush formations be used as standing operating procedures in small boat riverine operations.

(10) Small Boat Counter Ambush Techniques

(a) OBSERVATION: When ambushed by ground forces, small boats must take prearranged actions.

(b) EVALUATION: Since most small boats carry their main armament in the bow section, their best move is to advance into the enemy fire when ambushed. This also reduces their silhouette, making the boats more difficult to hit. As soon as the boat is beached, the troops should dismount and set down a base of fire. This method of reaction is illustrated in Incl 7 to Incl 8 (1st Engr Battalion ORLL). One successful ambush was conducted by the enemy against 1st Engineer Battalion "Ski" Boats while on patrol. One boat was immediately sunk by an RPG round and the occupants of the other two boats suffered casualties from the small arms fire that followed the initial attack. A fourth boat came through the attack almost unscathed due to the discipline of the boat operator. At the first burst of fire, he made a hard flank turn and drove his boat full throttle into the enemy bank. The infantry scrambled ashore and were the only personnel in a position to take the enemy under fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: All personnel engaged in small boat operations should be briefed and drilled in this combat proven method of reacting to enemy ambushes.

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## (11) Riverine Tactical Resupply

(a) OBSERVATION: Resupply of small boats should be accomplished from different locations each day to deny the enemy opportunities to ambush these craft.

(b) EVALUATION: It is necessary to rotate small boat crews and resupply them on a regular basis. Resupply is accomplished at different locations each day to prevent the boats from establishing a pattern of movement which could ease enemy attempts to ambush the boats or mine their docking areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That small boat resupply locations be varied as much as possible.

## (12) Water-Based Defoliation Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: The cost in terms of time, equipment, manpower and logistical support for a water-based defoliation operation is excessively high when measured against the results.

(b) EVALUATION: The following are considered minimum requirements to conduct a water-based defoliation operation of any significant magnitude: Two LCM-8 or similar craft to serve as prime movers (one is used as the spraying craft and the other to assist the first in maneuvers near the river bank, to carry extra defoliant and as an emergency back-up craft); two naval PBR or similar craft to provide security (each covers the other as they maneuver along the banks); two 250 GPM pumps, two water intake hoses, four spray hoses and nozzles, one proportionator and associated attachments, plus one 30 GPM pump, one S&P tractor and trailer to haul defoliant to resupply point; one wrecker, crane or forklift to load and unload defoliant; and one officer, one NCO and eight enlisted personnel to conduct the spraying operations. Spraying is limited to 20 kilometers a day due to the slow speed of LCM-8 in shallow water and the need to spray during high tide only for maximum depth of coverage. Excessive defoliant consumption, approximately 75 gallons (1.5 barrels) per kilometer, is due to the slow dissemination rate and the often low percentage of total defoliant sprayed which actually reaches the river bank.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That water-based defoliation operations be considered only when no other method is feasible. Better coverage could be obtained in one day using a UH-1 helicopter and six-man crew with a hunter-killer team as escort.

## (13) Enemy River Crossings

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(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy units in Vietnam often cross rivers in small groups on a wide front.

(b) EVALUATION: Trail activity indicates that the enemy will break down into small groups approximately 500 meters from the river bank. Crossings will be made in very small groups, each group "on its own" and assembly will take place some distance beyond the far bank.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That infantry units be made aware of this recurring technique.

## (14) Enemy Detection of Allied Troops

(a) OBSERVATION: Communist troops are often able to detect the presence of US forces in their area by the various odors peculiar to US personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Most easily detected are the odors of cigarette smoke and perspiration soaked fatigues. Other odors which reveal the presence of US troops include shaving lotion, highly perfumed soaps and insect repellent. The recognition of peculiar odors is considered to be an important means of detecting the presence of US personnel, and Communist troops are instructed to constantly remain alert for strange or unusual smells. Enemy sapper and reconnaissance elements are especially proficient in odor detection, since the manner of their activity requires close proximity to US troops. Communist personnel who are located downwind from US troops can successfully detect and identify odors up to a distance of 45 to 50 meters. Maximum distance at which odors can be detected when no wind is present is 25 to 30 meters.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That US troops take the following measures to lessen the possibility of detection by odor: Avoid using highly perfumed soaps and shaving lotions; change fatigues as often as possible (if changing is impractical, perspiration soaked fatigues should be air or wind dried often); avoid smoking when on patrols.

## (15) Operations Against Enemy Headquarters and Combat Support Units

(a) OBSERVATION: Communist/NVA headquarters and combat support units are usually positioned in relatively secure, remote areas.

(b) EVALUATION: Normally, enemy headquarters are located in heavily vegetated areas near stream and trail networks not readily accessible to mechanized units. The dense terrain affords more concealment and gives the inhabitants a better feeling of security. In these areas the enemy constructs more elaborate base camps with living bunkers rather than fighting bunkers. Tables, benches, cooking bunkers, latrines, showers and well used trails

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characterize such areas. During the dry season, the availability of mechanized infantry and Rome Plow support made it possible for the 1st Brigade to open up such safe havens, drive the enemy out and destroy his base operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That offensive Rome plow operations, in conjunction with mechanized infantry battalions, be employed to the maximum during the dry season to open up areas previously considered safe havens. Close attention should be paid to areas adjoining political and military boundaries, so that the enemy is not allowed to remain undisturbed in any location. PSYOP should be directed against the "good life" in the enemy headquarters as opposed to that of the combat units.

## (16) New Enemy Mining Techniques

(a) OBSERVATIONS: During mine sweep operations on QL 13 north of FSB Thunder III (XT772656) between east-west grid lines XT70 and XT72, 12 mines were found during the period 15-20 Dec 69. The mines found were generally 20 pound TNT mines, 12 inches in diameter with three pronged detonators screwed into the detonator wells on the mines. The mines were placed within a 100 meter stretch of road in sets of three. Each mine in the set was covered with numerous layers of acetate to provide a shield from the detectors. Generally the first two mines were covered with six to ten layers of acetate and placed so that the mine sweep team came to them first. The third was usually covered with only two layers of acetate. Most mines were placed in the road or on the shoulders where the road narrows. The type of TNT used was generally of poor quality. Most mines were found visually rather than by detector due to the method of emplacement and the failure of the enemy to remove the small round fuse containers from the immediate area.

(b) EVALUATION: The triple mining technique using acetate shields as a preventive measure against detection by mine detectors using the magnet-meter principle is potentially effective. The acetate acts like an insulator between the sensors of the detector and the metallic mine casing, effectively reducing the signal picked up by the operator. The length of the sweep, shortage of personnel and time requirements precluded a minute and detailed sweep of the entire seven and one-half kilometers of road. The failure of the the enemy to adequately camouflage the mines and police the area of detonator containers made it possible to detect the mines. However, many of the mines were skillfully emplaced and, after finding one mine in the ground, others were located only after a diligent search of the area already swept. The triple mining technique was not found elsewhere in the division AO, and seems to be a sophisticated extension of the more common double mine technique. However, this is the first time acetate has been used to dampen the signal the operator hears.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when the triple mining system with acetate shields is suspected or confirmed in an area, the sweep team halt and carefully check 100 meters along the road in both directions at least twice. All precautions for the immediate safety of the team should be observed, especially distances between elements, placement of security and probing.

## (17) Use of the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV)

(a) OBSERVATION: In clearing areas with large timbers, burning is the most efficient way to reduce the amount of material to be moved. However, the burning, smoldering timber often prevents the operation of bulldozers in the area for three or four days due to the risk of fire on the dozer's unprotected belly with its hydraulic lines and oil seeps.

(b) EVALUATION: The combat engineer vehicle (CEV) has proven effective in clearing areas which have recently been burned. Most large logs are effectively reduced in size by burning so that the CEV can manage them. With the underside completely protected by armor plate and the absence of loose hydraulic lines, the CEV can operate over smoldering timbers which present a hazard to the dozers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a CEV be made available to engineer units required to clear thick timber. The use of controlled fires greatly reduces the amount of material to be moved and, with a CEV, the areas can be adequately cleared immediately after the fire has subsided. Both the CEV driver and the track commander should be equipped with goggles to operate in smoke and dust.

## (18) Night Hawk Fire Clearances

(a) OBSERVATION: The time gap between Night Hawk sightings and reception of fire clearance is excessive.

(b) EVALUATION: Closer coordination with the ground units has shortened this clearance time. Also, a preflight briefing by the ground commander on friendly locations has proven effective and eliminated much wasted time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be placed on obtaining rapid fire clearances through increased coordination, even though this entails some loss of flying time.

## (19) Preplanned Close Air Support

(a) OBSERVATION: Forward air controllers (FAC) are receiving incomplete target descriptions. Too often targets are described only as base camps, with six digit coordinates, identifying an area of dense jungle.

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(b) EVALUATION: The size, number of bunkers, layout of the camp and relationship of the coordinates to the camp's center of mass are not given. With such poor descriptions, the FAC cannot determine whether he is attacking an area or a point target. Normally the FAC is not told the reason why the ground commander is requesting the strike. However, the intent of the ground commander often determines the method of attack used by the FAC. A few units consistently use an LOH with the OV-10. The LOH can mark either the bunkers to be hit or the general trace of the base camp. This technique is particularly effective in a heavily vegetated area where targets are difficult for the FAC to identify.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ground briefings at brigade be more definitive and include: intended target for each preplanned strike; a complete description of the target; the intent of the ground commander; possible secondary targets; friendly unit locations; and present tactical situation. When available, the unit commander can provide an LOH to direct the FAC and mark the desired target.

## (20) Night PSYOP

(a) OBSERVATION: PSYOP broadcasts were not reaching the enemy on a 24-hour basis.

(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period the division began flying one half of the daily psychological operations aerial missions between the hours of 2400 and 0600. Interrogation of Hoi Chanhs during this period firmly established that night broadcasts were heard, remembered and more clearly understood than day broadcasts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a significant percentage of a unit's psychological operations aerial missions be conducted at night to supplement and reinforce day missions.

## (21) Rallier/Hoi Chanh PSYOP

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period several groups of four or more ralliers have rallied in the division AO. On two separate occasions, groups of ralliers have rallied to convoys on roads.

(b) EVALUATION: Rallying in groups adds to the feeling of confidence and safety, and a road in an enemy's area of operation is a well defined rally point.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That propaganda developed against enemy units, whenever possible, include the suggestion to rally in a group and, if applicable, at a major road in the enemy's area of operations.

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## (22) CIVAC Procedures

(a) OBSERVATION: GVN officials are responsible for civic action; they must be encouraged to assume as much of this responsibility as possible.

(b) EVALUATION: On 30 Dec 69, the ACofS, G5, was informed that 20 homes in Chon Thanh Village, Binh Long Province, had been destroyed by fire. An investigation with GVN officials revealed that the province did not have any readily available food and lacked airtransport capability. After a quick evaluation of GVN resources and capabilities, the G5 offered to supply canned foodstuff and the required air transportation for immediate relief only. Fifty cases of canned foods and 120 lbs of rice were flown to the disaster area and distributed by district officials. Then the province and district officials took over the remainder of the relief using GVN resources. ARVN MED-CAP and VIS Teams assisted the program under the direction of district officials. Similar situations can be solved by insisting that GVN use their own resources as much as possible before providing US aid.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That US civil affairs personnel insure that GVN officials use their own resources as much as possible.

## d. Organization.

### (1) Rome Plow Maintenance

(a) OBSERVATION: Continuous Rome plow maintenance is essential. But wheeled vehicles are inadequate for transporting the Rome plows' maintenance element when the plows are engaged in field operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Recently, the concept of Rome plow employment has changed from area clearing to offensive clearing in support of mechanized maneuver units. This type operation prohibits the wheeled maintenance vehicles from traveling with the plows. Providing M548 "Camels" to carry the air compressor and welding set gives the maintenance section the same mobility as the plows and permits continuous maintenance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That engineer units using Rome plows as offensive weapons in support of maneuver units be provided with M548's to carry their maintenance element.

### (2) Organization of the Division G5 Staff Section

(a) OBSERVATION: More emphasis was needed to make PSYOP intelligence and propaganda mesh in the G5 Staff Section.

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(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period the Intelligence and Propaganda Development Section was moved to a new building, separate from the Operations Section of the PSYOP department, and reorganized under the Assistant PSYOP Officer. This allowed greater concentration on intelligence collection and assisted propaganda development. Current intelligence on enemy units is now brought to the attention of the Assistant PSYOP Officer immediately, allowing propaganda to be developed as accurately and quickly as possible against the enemy unit concerned.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Intelligence and Propaganda Development Sections be organized under the supervision of Assistant PSYOP Officers. This facilitates the close coordination needed between intelligence collection and propaganda development.

## (3) Organization of MP Companies

(a) OBSERVATION: MTOE 19-27G does not provide for a unit mess section for MP companies.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1st MP Company Headquarters is presently operating mess facilities in conjunction with a neighboring medical company. This operation proves satisfactory in the static base camp situation. However, in the event the 1st Military Police Company Headquarters is relocated, there are no organic provisions for providing messing facilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That future TOE recommendations for field MP companies include an organic mess section capable of providing unit mess facilities.

## e. Training.

### (1) Mechanical Ambush Training (see Inclosure 15)

(a) OBSERVATION: Mental errors on the part of individuals using the mechanical ambush have resulted in some accidents.

(b) EVALUATION: All individuals employing the mechanical ambush must be well trained in its use. Training must emphasize that all discussion, sketch-making, pace-counting and familiarization with the area must be completed prior to anyone going near the battery for the purpose of arming the ambush. All personnel must be on the ground, behind cover and to the rear of the claymores before the battery is connected or disconnected. The minimum distance for placement of the battery is 40 feet to the rear of the claymores.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continuous training and supervision be conducted to insure that reliable and competent personnel emplace mechanical ambushes.

## (2) Training Infantry Sweep Teams

(a) OBSERVATION: Having engineer mine sweep teams located in semi-permanent FSB to open daily the overland resupply route into the FSB is a waste of engineer effort.

(b) EVALUATION: Engineer troops can give infantry on-the-job training in mine sweeping techniques. This frees engineer troops for other work that can be accomplished only by engineers. All maneuver battalions have mine detectors in their TO&E. Mechanized infantry and cavalry troops that are qualified in the use of the mine detectors greatly add to the mobility of their units because they are always available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all situations involving prolonged use of engineer troops as mine sweepers be analyzed to determine if the engineers can be replaced by infantry sweepers. Two weeks of OJT and supervision has been found adequate for this purpose.

## (3) ARVN Engineer Training

(a) OBSERVATION: When US personnel conduct engineer training for ARVN units, interpreters are not always able to adequately translate technical information.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1st Engineer Battalion has conducted training programs in engineering subjects for the 5th and 18th ARVN Engineer Battalions. Because the interpreter has to teach the course rather than only translate it, it is essential that he thoroughly understand the subject matter. Available interpreters often had no engineer background and had difficulty explaining technical portions of the instruction. To solve this problem, interpreters first translated the lesson plan into Vietnamese and then rehearsed the class with the instructor. This gave the interpreter a chance to ask questions about technical aspects he did not understand.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That proficient interpreters be selected for instruction of technical subjects and that they be drilled in the subject beforehand so that they may actually participate in the instruction.

## (4) Reaction to Radar Tracking Devices

(a) OBSERVATION: Pilots have continued to hear a buzzing sound over their

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FM radios that could have been enemy radar guided anti-aircraft weapons tracking their position. No ground fire was received on any of these occasions.

(b) EVALUATION: Although there is no evidence to prove that these were radar tracking devices, the possibility cannot be discounted.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Newly assigned aviators should be thoroughly briefed on recognizing this situation, evasive tactics to be taken and the proper reporting procedures.

## (5) Aviation Standardization Training

(a) OBSERVATION: The division's aviation standardization program has been re-evaluated and increased emphasis has been placed on 90-day standardization training.

(b) EVALUATION: An effective standardization program is essential to keeping pilots proficient and current in procedures required for safe flight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be placed on an effective standardization training program by all commanders with organic aviation assets.

## f. Logistics.

### (1) Commanders' Critical Item List (CCIL)

(a) OBSERVATION: The CCIL has become an administrative project and, due to continuous combat operations and rapid changes of AO, is often not properly emphasized.

(b) EVALUATION: Without the necessary command emphasis, mission essential items are often neglected or overlooked, affecting the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. Battalion S-4 must regularly evaluate items/repair parts on requisition throughout the battalion to determine if the items are combat essential.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That battalion commanders personally evaluate and approve the CCIL. Based on staff and unit recommendations, the battalion commander should determine those items/repair parts to be designated critical based on accomplishment of mission, welfare of the combat soldier and battalion administrative requirements.

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## (2) Opening and Closing of FSB

(a) OBSERVATION: The closing of FSB and similar field locations usually requires considerable transportation assets.

(b) EVALUATION: Field bases are normally opened with the support of 14-16 CH-47 sorties to insert barrier material. Over a period of time, as roads are opened, considerable amounts of TO&E equipment and barrier material are moved into the location. As a result, when bases are closed, backhaul becomes a major task and overtaxes available transportation. This problem is particularly evident when two or more bases are closed simultaneously and combat troops are withdrawn by vehicle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That priority be given to air assets for relocation of troops entering a new AO, and priority for truck assets be given to units closing bases. If necessary, bases should be closed one at a time.

## (3) Refueling and Resupply of Navy River Patrol Boats (PBR)

(a) OBSERVATION: Refueling and resupply of PBR has been hindered by a lack of necessary resources.

(b) EVALUATION: A heavy duty pump, high pressure hose and pressure valves are necessary to conduct efficient refueling operations. These items are difficult to procure through normal logistical channels. Since this equipment is in daily use, the maintenance requirement is high.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Prior to conducting joint operations between military services, there should be a coordination meeting to insure that all necessary equipment can be made available prior to conducting operations. Action should be taken immediately to assist ARVN and VNN in handling the problem as the VNN will soon take over all the PBR.

## (4) Equipment Turn-in of Redeploying Units

(a) OBSERVATION: When the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division became official, division units started turn-in of nonessential equipment immediately.

(b) EVALUATION: Turn-in of equipment not essential to combat operations is a necessary part of pre-stand down operations in order to reduce the time of the actual stand down period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That redeploying units begin turn-in of equipment as soon as possible to obtain a zero balance on the property books.

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## (5) Aircraft Maintenance

(a) OBSERVATION: The requirements for DSU to perform backup organization aircraft maintenance has increased throughout the quarter.

(b) EVALUATION: A sample one week period in December 1969 revealed that 24% of all maintenance operations performed were organizational jobs. Man hours expended by the DSU in performing organizational maintenance detracts from the overall direct support mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the DSU carefully screen all requests for backup organizational maintenance, while still giving maximum overall support to customer units.

## (6) Stock Control of Major Assemblies

(a) OBSERVATION: Certain major assemblies require intensive management even at as low a level as division main support company.

(b) EVALUATION: One clerk can be made responsible for a small number of major assemblies (less than 200). The assemblies can be physically segregated from other parts and controlled manually rather than by the NCR 500. Close supervision permits special requirements to be met.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That selected major assemblies be "hand managed" in preference to automated stock control.

## g. Communications.

### (1) Tactical Small Boat Communications

(a) OBSERVATION: In small boat operations, the necessity for quick reactions to emergency situations makes good communication between boats essential.

(b) EVALUATION: Boats usually move in groups of four, with up to 100 meters separating them. In order to react to directions from the command boat, two methods of communications are used. Each boat has a PRC-25 radio by which it maintains contact with the other boats. Should the radios malfunction, all personnel are familiar with a set of hand signals which can be used to direct the boats (see Inclosure 2 of Inclosure 8, 1st Engr Battalion ORLL).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That at least two means of communication be used to control small boat operations, radios and hand signals. All personnel operating boats must be familiar with these hand signals and be able to react

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to them properly.

## (2) Monthly Change of Frequencies and Call Signs

(a) OBSERVATION: Changing frequencies, call signs and suffixes monthly offers more disadvantages than advantages.

(b) EVALUATION: The number of nets required by current tactical doctrine and organization, the volume of information exchanged between units, the requirement for major unit (discreet) frequencies, and the increased range of the current family of FM radios have eliminated the need for changing call signs, suffixes and frequencies. The monthly changeover causes serious communications voids between tactical units, especially in smaller units on shared frequencies where override is a serious problem. Artillery fire nets and infantry command nets often fall into these categories. An infantry battalion often devotes 3-5 days of continuous "juggling" to obtain frequencies which are marginally satisfactory. Often it is necessary to take an alternate frequency from one unit (usually at company level) and assign it as the primary of another unit. In most cases the procedure described above leaves both units with unsatisfactory alternate frequencies. The rationale of the monthly change is transmission security. At small unit level, however, changing frequencies, call signs and suffixes confuses the enemy only for a few hours. With the quality of today's radios, the enemy can identify an operator by his tone of voice and personal characteristics, and note the new frequency and call sign.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That unit call signs, suffixes and frequencies not be changed monthly. Once a net has had its major problems resolved, it should be allowed to operate as long as it remains effective.

## (3) Increased Use of Secure Nets

(a) OBSERVATION: Most radio traffic is being monitored by the enemy. Some tactical nets are being converted to full time secure nets.

(b) EVALUATION: As proven by the capture of the MI Section of SR-1, the enemy does have the capability of monitoring friendly radio nets. The use of unauthorized codes also compromises information passed by radio. Secure nets would remove the enemy intercept capability, reduce COMSEC violations and make codes unnecessary. Disadvantages include excess weight and sensitivity, and the danger of capture.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That secure equipment be installed and used at the lowest level feasible, and that transmission security continue to be stressed.

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## h. Material.

### (1) Secondary Growth Destruction Devices

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of Rome plows to cut secondary growth is inefficient. Disc harrows are in short supply.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1st Engineer Battalion has found that a grass cutter, the property of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, is outstanding for cutting secondary growth including grass, bushes and small saplings. The cutter's basic component is a heavy roller fitted with vanes. The roller bends the foliage and the vanes chop or break it. After a few days the dead foliage can be burned off. The cutter can be drawn with a bulldozer, armored personnel carrier or a five-ton dump truck.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an investigation be made to determine if this type of grass cutter, or one using the same principle, can be mass produced for use by all engineer units in RVN. Photographs and detailed mechanical drawings of the cutter have been submitted to USARV Engineer Office.

### (2) Simulating Smell of Food

(a) OBSERVATION: The odor of food dispensed from a helicopter could be used in conjunction with PSYOP to induce hungry enemy to rally.

(b) EVALUATION: The majority of the enemy who have rallied to Allied control during this reporting period have stated that the major reason for surrendering was hunger. At the request of 1st Infantry Division, the Limited War Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, has been experimenting with food concentrates suspended in fog oil and dispensed from the XM52, helicopter-mounted, smoke generating system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That research continue to develop a system for disseminating the smell of food from a helicopter.

### (3) XM-706 (V-100) Armored Car

(a) OBSERVATION: The XM-706 armored car was issued with a limited PLL/ASL.

(b) EVALUATION: Repair parts for the armored car continue to be limited. The usefulness of this otherwise excellent vehicle is crippled by the lack of repair parts. Presently, the 1st MP Company is experiencing fifty percent (50%) deadline rate as a result of this shortage.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an adequate repair parts system for the XM-706 armored cars be established as soon as possible.

## (4) The M-73 Machinegun

(a) OBSERVATION: The M-73 machinegun has a history of malfunction and unreliable service when mounted in the V-100 armored car.

(b) EVALUATION: The unreliability of M-73 machineguns mounted in the V-100 greatly reduces the effectiveness of the armored car.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Until such time as the M-73 is perfected for use in the V-100, the armored car should be fitted with an alternate weapons system, possibly dual M-60's or .50 cal machineguns.

## (5) Xenon Searchlights

(a) OBSERVATION: Several Xenon searchlights, 9910B, have burned out power converters.

(b) EVALUATION: A major cause of power converter failure is operator abuse of the equipment by switching the searchlight on and off several times in rapid succession. This procedure causes a power surge often large enough to burn the converter wiring.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders be made aware of the fact that searchlight operators can damage their equipment in this way and thereby deadline the carrier vehicle.

## (6) Vehicular-Mounted Radio Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION: Compared to radios operating off batteries or fixed power sources, vehicle-mounted radios have a much higher breakdown rate.

(b) EVALUATION: A large percentage of vehicular-mounted sets are down because of burned out parts caused by power surges.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emphasis be placed on equipment being off when the vehicle has a defective power or charging source.

## (7) AN/PPS-5 Radar Set

(a) OBSERVATION: AN/PPS-5 radar sets are being received at DS maintenance with a system of low sensitivity. They are generally off frequency because the magnetron and local oscillator are not aligned and the intermediate frequency

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cannot be obtained.

(b) EVALUATION: The sets can only be repaired at DS or GS level which results in excessive down time. In most cases, the problem is caused by the user trying to adjust the AFC. Although the user may adjust the AFC, the local oscillator, variator and magnetron must be adjusted with equipment not available to the operator.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the user not attempt any adjustment in the RT unit.

(8) BB-622 A/U and B-622 B/U batteries

(a) OBSERVATION: Many AN/PPS-5 radar sets are being turned in for low sensitivity due to battery failure.

(b) EVALUATION: The radar sets were completely operational in nearly every instance, but batteries were not fully charged or were improperly serviced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Proper use must be made of the battery filler kits. When using other than the recommended charger (the PP-4127 A/U) for these batteries, caution must be taken not to overcharge or dry out the battery.

(9) A-9 Module in the RT-505:

(a) OBSERVATION: An excessively large number of A-9 modules in the receiver transmitter RT-505 are being replaced.

(b) EVALUATION: This module wears with adjustments. The module life can be extended by keeping adjustments to a minimum.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That radio repairmen keep adjustments to a minimum on the A-9 module.

(10) Replacement of Window and Door Glass

(a) OBSERVATION: Current practice has been to use DA Form 2407 Work Request for glass replacement.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the nature of glass work, a direct exchange program would facilitate faster turn-around time for the customer.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That glass repair be on a direct exchange basis  
whenever possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. T. Selby*  
C.T. SELBY  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

16 Incl

- ~~1 - Organizational Structure~~
- ~~2 - List of Key Commanders~~
- ~~3 - Force Disposition~~
- ~~4 - 1st Bde ORLL~~
- ~~5 - 2d Bde ORLL~~
- ~~6 - 3d Bde ORLL~~
- ~~7 - Support Command ORLL~~
- 8 - 1st Engr Bn ORLL
- ~~9 - 1st Avn Bn ORLL~~
- ~~10 - 121st Sig Bn ORLL~~
- ~~11 - 1st MP Co ORLL~~
- 12 - Div Chem Sec ORLL
- 13 - 1st Inf Div Circulars
- 14 - Shotgun Technique of Area Saturation
- 15 - Mechanical Ambushes
- ~~16 - 1st Inf Div Regulations~~

Incls 1 - 7, 9 - 11 and 16 wd HQ, DA

## DISTRIBUTION

- 1-OCMH, DA
- 2-CG, USARPAC, ATTN: AVGPOP-DT
- 1-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCS-MH
- 3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
- 3-CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN: G3 Analysis
- 2-CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN: 7th MHD
- 1-CG, 1st Inf Div, ATTN: AVDB-T-MHD
- 1-CG, 1st Inf Div, ATTN: AVDB-T-T
- 1-CO, 1st Bde
- 1-CO, Div Arty

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AVFBC-RE (10 Mar 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 17 MAR 70

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC (DST), APO 96365

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, C. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for the period ending 31  
January 1970, with the following exceptions:

a. Paragraph 2g(2), page 44, recommends that unit call signs, suffixes and frequencies not be changed monthly. II FFORCEV Reg 380-6 (C), dtd 13 Aug 68 and USARV Reg 380-13 (C), dtd 24 Apr 68 require that call signs and call words be randomly rotated within each division and separate brigade and equivalent-sized unit at least each month, that a complete change of new call signs and call words be initiated once every three months, and call signs and call words be changed concurrently with all frequency changes. The ability of the enemy to monitor and exploit traffic passed in the clear on our radio nets has been more than adequately demonstrated by the recent capture of an enemy COMINT team. The hand written summary of friendly transmissions indicates that the enemy has concentrated his efforts on battalion and brigade level nets. As long as some of these nets are operated in the clear, making periodic changes of frequencies, call signs, and suffixes as well as occasionally changing radio operators provides the best means to impede the enemy COMINT effort. Making these changes at odd intervals with the average time between changes being less than 30 days will provide some improvement in transmission security. Of course, given a large volume of radio traffic and enough time, the enemy will be able to identify certain nets again but the period of time that it takes him to establish identification will hamper his COMINT efforts. Use of the low power setting on the VRC-12 series radio wherever possible will further degrade the enemy's monitoring by reducing the effective range of the transmission and at the same time reduce the possibility of interference with another unit using the same frequency. While some frequency "juggling" may take place when interference problems arise, procedures for resolving these problems have been established and should be followed.

b. Reference paragraph 2a(3), page 27, observation is incorrect for the following reasons.

1. AR 672-5-1 authorizes individual and unit awards to foreign personnel and units. Paragraph 5g, AR 672-5-1 authorizes CG, USARV to award the Valorous

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVFBC-EE (10 Mar 70)


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Unit Award and the Meritorious Unit Commendation to US and foreign units. While the authority to approve unit awards cannot be delegated by CG, USARV, recommendations can be forwarded to USARV for approval.

2. Paragraph 2b(4), USARV Regulation 672-1, dated 1 Jul 69, and paragraph 18, II FFV Regulation 672-1, dated 18 Aug 69, authorize division commanders to impact awards for valorous acts to combat personnel in grades O3 and below in RVNAF, to include RF/PF personnel. These impact awards are limited to the Bronze Star Medal with "V" device and the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W. C. BARTEL JR  
CPT AGC  
Asst AG

Copy furnished:  
1st Inf Div

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AVHGC-DST (10 March 1970) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period  
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

22 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of Intelligence Squads", page 28, paragraph 2b(1): concur. Establishing a close identification with local citizens can result in obtaining valuable information concerning enemy movements, plans and activities and thus enhance the security and success of US/Allied operations. This item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Spot Reports", page 28, paragraph 2b(2): concur. The use of any aid which benefits the commander in the assimilation and expeditious reporting of intelligence information is encouraged by this headquarters. This item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Enemy Counter Mechanical Ambush Techniques", page 30, paragraph c(4) and "Magnetic Effect of M57 Claymore Firing Device", page 31, paragraph c(6): concur. These items have been extracted for possible inclusion in next USARV Tips for Commanders.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Riverine Tactical Resupply", page 33, paragraph 2c(11): concur. Established and stereotype patterns of movements can be invaluable aids to the enemy in planning and executing ambush operations against US/Allied personnel. The use of irregular patterns of movement will enhance the security of US/Allied operations and decrease the opportunities for successful exploitation by the enemy. This item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period  
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e. (U) Reference item concerning "Enemy Detection of Allied Troops", page 34, paragraph 2c(14): concur. This headquarters encourages the implementation of all measures which will enhance operations security and decrease the foreknowledge/forewarning which can be provided to the enemy. This item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "New Enemy Mining Techniques", page 35, paragraph c(16): concur. The use of acetate as an insulating shield to preclude detection by a magnetic detector may be effective. Until further information can be obtained, evaluation of this method is pending. However, subject item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

g. (C) Reference item concerning "Rallier/Hoi Chanh PSYOP", page 37, paragraph 2c(21): concur. While recommended techniques of propaganda development may be applicable in the 1st Infantry Division TAOR, they may not be effective throughout ARVN. The proper development of a propaganda message is a critical aspect of PSYOP. FM 33-5, Psychological Operations and Procedures, establishes guidelines for audience analysis and propaganda preparation.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Organization of MP Companies", page 39, paragraph 2d(3): nonconcur. The MP Company is organized to provide MP support from several locations within the division area. In all cases the intent is for the supporting MP platoon to mess with the supported brigade or other assigned headquarters.

i. (C) Reference item concerning "Monthly Change of Frequencies and Callsigns", page 44, paragraph 2g(2): nonconcur. This headquarters concurs with comment contained in paragraph a, 1st Indorsement, HQ II FFORCEV. The translation of a captured NVA/VC working aid for intercept of US and RVNAF communications vividly revealed the communications security (COMSEC) weakness inherent in the infrequent change of frequencies/callsigns. This translation is contained in MACV J2/TAREX Report, TIR RVN 06-70, which will be forwarded by this headquarters to all major subordinate commands, including divisions and separate brigades, during March 1970. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.


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j. (C) Reference item concerning "Increased Use of Secure Nets", page 44, paragraph 2g(3): concur. Due to strong command emphasis and priority actions, increased installation and utilization of NESTOR equipment is being reported throughout all subordinate commands. Maximum utilization of NESTOR equipment will enhance USARV's overall operations security (OPSEC) posture. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "XM-706 (V-100) Armored Car", page 45, paragraph h(3): nonconcur. Repair parts for the XM 706 (V-100) Commando Car can be and are being received through use of normal MILSTRIP requisitioning procedures. Recent experience indicates that normal supply channels are working well for those units that request supplies properly using the V100 project code.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
L. D. MURRAY  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
HQ, II FFORCEV  
1st Inf Div

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GPOP-DT (10 Mar 70) 3d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Division for Period  
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 1st Engineer Battalion  
1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

AVDB-CE-0

2 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Engineer Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDB-T-MHD  
APO 96345

1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. Organization: The 1st Engineer Battalion is the organic divisional combat engineer battalion for the 1st Infantry Division. Headquarters and Headquarters Company located in Lai Khe Base Camp provides command and staff supervision for combat engineer support to the 1st Infantry Division. Engineer equipment support is provided by the heavy equipment platoon and consists of: a 20 ton rough terrain crane, graders, five ton dump trucks, sheepsfoot, wobbly wheel, and steel wheel rollers, 10 ton tractors, 25 ton low-boy trailers, scoop loaders, and water and asphalt distributors. This equipment is attached to line companies on a mission basis to provide additional support.

The AVLB section, which is attached to Headquarters Company, consists of four launchers and six bridges. This section has been deployed on a mission basis throughout the Division TAOR and in support of ARVN and other US units.

The Rome Flow section is organic to Headquarters Company and consists of six Rome Flows, an Armored Personnel Carrier, and a complete maintenance section. The Rome Flow section is placed in direct support of 1st Infantry Division units to accomplish area land clearance in the TAOR.

Company A is located in Dau Tieng Base Camp. It provided direct combat support to the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

Company B is direct support to the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Presently Company B is located south of Bear Cat in AO Dagger. Prior to 15 December 1969, they were located in Di An Base Camp. They moved briefly into Lai Khe Base Camp before moving to their present area of operations on 1 January 1970.

Company C located at Lai Khe Base Camp provided direct combat engineer support for the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Company C elements are dispersed throughout the Brigade Area of Operations.

Company D is the general support engineer company for the 1st Infantry Division. With its headquarters located at Lai Khe Base Camp the company consists of a headquarters platoon and three line platoons. Two of the line platoons are organized for the specific mission of providing the Battalion guard commitment while the third platoon is tasked with both combat and construction support missions.

Company E is located at Di An Base Camp. The company's primary mission is to provide the Division with a rapid temporary bridging capability. Additionally, Company E operates ~~Kearner~~ Ski Barges in support of Division riverine operations and provides engineer construction support for projects in Di An Base Camp. The company is composed of two bridge platoons, each of which has two sections, and a headquarters platoon for company operations.

b. Administration:

(1) As of 18 January 1970, the Battalion Staff was:

Commanding Officer: LTC Rodney E. Cox  
Executive Officer: MAJ William A. Hokanson  
Assistant Division Engineer: MAJ Dennis J. York  
S-1: 1LT James D. Nix  
S-2: 1LT Randolph Ellis  
S-3: MAJ Albert R. Colan  
S-4: CPT Martin S. Anderson  
CO, HHC: CPT Carl Collins  
CO, A Co: CPT James C. Patrick  
CO, B Co: CPT Robert M. Amrine  
CO, C Co: CPT Barry J. Cantor  
CO, D Co: CPT Anson F. Thorp  
CO, E Co: CPT James H. Glock

(2) Personnel changes within this period were 94 departees processed out and 80 replacements processed in. There continues to be a shortage of engineer squad leaders MOS: 12B40, and Medics 91B20.

c. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence:

Daily intelligence reports from 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and Headquarters, 3rd Brigade are processed by the Battalion S-2 and further disseminated to subordinate units within this command. In addition, local base camp commanders provide intelligence data for elements of the Battalion at base camps separate from the Battalion Headquarters. These reports along with intelligence documents from II FIELD FORCE - VIETNAM, higher headquarters and recurring SITREPS from the S-2 section are utilized for planning local security requirements for Engineer operations. Route reconnaissance was accomplished on a daily basis by the recon elements of the S-2 section.

d. Operations:

(1) Land Clearing During the quarter: The 1st Engineer Battalion Rome Flow section cleared 2,265 acres of jungle in support of the 1st Infantry Division.

(2) Mine Sweep Operations: During the quarter, the Battalion continued to support the 1st Infantry Division with mine sweep teams. One hundred seven mines were encountered on routes swept by the 1st Engineer Battalion this quarter. Seventy-one, or 67 percent, were detected and destroyed prior to detonation by friendly vehicles.

Company A swept LTL-14 from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee daily during the period 1 November 69 to 9 December 69. Using three sweep parties, the unit opened the road from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee daily by 1000 hrs. On 9 December 69, infantry units assumed responsibility for these sweeps. In addition, sweep parties from Company A accompanied infantry units on eight cache search missions lasting two to three days each. The personnel and equipment involved in these search missions were two men and one detector. On 14 December 69, a one time sweep from FSB Tennessee to Ben Cat on LTL-14 was completed to pass Company B, 2/34th Armor over this route.

Company B also performed numerous mine sweeps to assure the safe and unrestricted use of vital roads and MSR's in the AO. Before an AO change on 15 December 69, four sweep teams were used to sweep route Orange from Ben Cat to FSB Jim (XT884390) and Route LTL-16 from Claymore Corners (XT888367) to Tan Uyen. After the AO change, mine sweep teams were required to sweep Route Orange from Ben Cat to the Song Be Bridge, Route LTL-16 from Claymore Corners to FSB Normandy III (XT904318), and Route QL-13 from Lai Khe north to the 77 east-west grid. On 1 January 70, another AO change resulted in Route Orange being swept by non-divisional engineers, Route LTL-16 by 1/18th Inf and Route QL-13 by C Company. Additionally small scale sweep requirements in support of tactical operations were provided to Brigade units after the regularly assigned sweeps were completed.

Prior to the Brigade AO change on 15 December 69, Company C accomplished the mine sweep from Lai Khe to Thunder II (555 east-west grid) using three sweep teams. Company C also conducted the sweep of Route 240 from Ben Cat to FSB Dominate (XT706442) with two sweep teams. The security from the 2/16th Inf was integrated into this mine sweep operation and after a two-week training period assumed the sweep on Route 240. This freed two engineer squads for other duties. Sweep teams on several occasions opened Boundary Road. Mines detected during this period were primarily of the type using "slap stick" detonators with the detonators buried in wheel marks on the road shoulders. The charges were placed just off the centerline. This Route had been unused for a long time and several vehicles detonated deeply buried mines that could not be detected visually. The mines contained little metal and were always found in pairs.

(3) Battalion Tunnel Rats: Tunnel exploration and destruction was carried out by the two Tunnel Rat Teams of the Battalion S-2 Section. Each team is composed of one officer, one RTO and two Kit Carson Scouts. When not performing duties as tunnel rats, the teams are used in reconnaissance of areas, bridges, and routes designated by the operations section. Each team works independently. Activities during the period 1 October 60 to 15 December 69 were:

(a) Supported C Company, 2/2nd Inf (Mech) on 8 November 69. Investigated three (3) wells approximately 25 feet deep, thought at first to be tunnel entrances. Negative finds and negative results.

The Rome Plow section began the quarter with continued support of the 1/16th Inf. The first ten days of November 69, 235 acres were cut in grid squares XT6236 and XT6438. During a one week standdown, three worn-out plows were replaced.

On 17 November 69, 25 acres were cleared just north of Lai Khe at XT974-405. The plows then moved north of Boundary Road to XT7056 where they cut 240 acres in seven days. The following six days, 175 acres were cleared in the vicinity of XT7156.

After a two day maintenance standdown ending 1 December 69, 65 acres including several landing zones and RON sites were cut in the area around XT6857. On 16 December 69, the plows moved east of QL-13 where they cleared 245 acres between LTL-13 and the Song Be River, primarily around grid squares XT8466 and XT8664.

On 17 December 69, the plows returned to Lai Khe for a maintenance standdown until Christmas. During this time two more tractors were received to replace two additional "washouts".

On 26 December 69, the plows moved to the vicinity of Minh Thanh. During the next 10 days, 340 acres were cleared. On 5 January 70, the plows returned to Lai Khe for a one day standdown to transfer the maintenance section from M-548's to their own organic wheeled vehicles. On 6 January 70, the plows moved to FSB Kien in support of 2/28th Inf. For the next three weeks a total of 940 acres were cut in grid squares XT5344, XT5242, and XT5439.

During this quarter, the Division changed the concept of Rome Plow operations. Instead of clearing large pre-designated areas, the plows were utilized as tactical offensive weapons. Cuts were in strips and patterns through and around suspected enemy concentrations and base camp areas. This allowed the supported combat unit to move readily behind the plows to conduct cordons and sweeps of the suspected enemy locations. Consequently, the total acreage cleared by the plows this quarter was less than any previous quarter this year.

This new mode of operation has created a problem in that the plows often move so fast they outrun their maintenance train. As a result, the quantity and quality of mandatory maintenance was reduced causing an increase in deadline time and operator fatigue. To alleviate this situation heavy emphasis has been placed on more frequent short rest and daily maintenance periods.

In CY 1969, the 1st Engineer Battalion Rome Plows cleared more than 10,000 acres of jungle.

During this quarter, Company A was tasked to clear the secondary growth along LTL-14 from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee (XT581333) to reduce the vulnerability to ambush of the daily convoy from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee. One dozer and one heavy grass cutter borrowed from the Michelin Rubber Corporation were employed. While the dozer cleared heavy areas of brush, the grass cutter chopped up lighter growth. The cutter was pulled by an APC or a five ton dump truck. Diesel fuel was sprayed over the cut foliage and then burned. A 50 meter swath was cut on each side of the road. An area approximately 50 meters by 600 meters was cleared each day.

(b) Supported D Company 2/28th Inf on 20-21 November 69. Investigated a base camp area that contained one tunnel 500-600 meters long, a second tunnel 30-40 meters long, and approximately eight bunkers. Both tunnels and bunkers were destroyed. Located 1 US type claymore, wire, and detector, 2 each illumination canisters (4.2") and VC digging equipment.

(c) Supported B Company 2/2nd Inf (Mech) on 21-22 November 69. Investigated 4 tunnels. One tunnel was 70 meters in length while the other three were 80 meters in length. Negative finds.

(d) Supported B Troop 1/4th Cav on 26 November 69. Investigated a shaft 12 to 15 feet deep and 18 inches in diameter. Searched bottom of shaft and found 9 small caverns 12 feet deep and 4 foot high. Results: articles of clothing, small bag of rice, cooking pot, pistol belt, parts of enemy bodies and a note book.

(e) Supported A Troop 1/4th Cav on 27 November 69. Investigated small number of tunnels, one of which was 25-30 meters in length. Negative finds.

(f) Supported D Company 1/28th Inf on 19-22 January 70 in the Trap-azaid. Searched 225 meters of tunnel. Results: 1-SKS, 8-AK-47's, 1-M60 machine gun, 1-BAR, 300 rounds of M60 ammo, 2 rifle grenades, 1-AT grenade, 12 packs, 2-sewing machines, 400 yards of canvas material, 300 ammo pouches, and 6 claymores.

When not on tunnel missions the "Rat Teams" provided engineer reconnaissance necessary to support Division operations. The following significant reconnaissance missions were performed during the quarter:

(a) Route Reconnaissance: Was performed almost daily somewhere in the Division AO. Aerial reconnaissance was made on routes 1A, 2A, QL-13, LTL-14, 245, 239, 301, 240, 302, and boundary Road.

(b) Ground Reconnaissance was made of routes LTL-14, TL-2A, QL-13, LTL-13, 240, 239, 301, LTL-16, and Boundary Road. As the need arose, recons were made of specific bridges and water gaps for up-to-the-minute information. Sites included XT653485, XT615522, XT613521, XT604514, XT846534, and XT675586.

(c) Airfield Reconnaissance: A reconnaissance of Minh Thanh airfield was conducted on 9 December 69 in anticipation of opening a forward Brigade CP at that location.

(4) Landing Zone Missions: Company C has provided a platoon to cut ten landing zones with chain saws and explosives in support of 3rd Brigade operations. This land clearing technique was also employed to deny the enemy concealment along trails known to be used as supply routes. The LZ team normally spent two days in the field with one resupply scheduled on the first day.

Teams were inserted by ladder assault from CH-47 Chinook helicopters. Resupply and extraction were also made by Chinook.

All line companies maintain LZ teams on standby, but only Company C's team was actually employed during the quarter.



(5) Fire Support Base and Night Defensive Position Upgrade and Construction: During this quarter Company A had the task of upgrading FSB Kien (XT519418), FSB Tennessee, and FSB Pine Ridge (XT522588). At FSB Kien the internal drainage was improved, roads graded and ditched, culverts placed where needed, four 155mm Howitzer pads were built, the old sanitary fill was closed and a new one opened, and approximately 50 loads of laterite hauled into the FSB. At FSB Tennessee, an access road was constructed, a new berm built around the reduced perimeter and fields of fire were cleared. A D-5 dozer was airlifted into FSB Pine Ridge to accomplish clearing and the construction of a berm. In addition Company A set up its own Night Defensive Position during the last week of November. The 3rd Platoon established NDP Cold Harbor (XT598501) and occupied it for approximately one week, while working on the road, culvert and AVLB site vicinity XT6152.

On 15 December 69, Company B relocated its CP and billets at Lai Khe Base Camp. The unit also assumed responsibility for upgrade of FSB's Thunder I (XT784451), Thunder II (XT785557), and Thunder III (XT768649) in addition to FSB Jim, FSB Normandy III, FSB Florida (XT018329), and Chanh Luu. On 1 January 1970, Company B moved to a new area of operations south of Bear Cat. During the next two weeks, Company B was involved in the construction of three fire support bases; Colorado (YS313807), Dakota (YS243779), and Rhode Island (YS436766). Improvements to these three fire support bases continues throughout the period of this report.

Construction and upgrade of FSB's and NDP's was a significant part of Company C's operations. A D-5 dozer was found to be most useful in establishing a FSB or a NDP in the monsoon season due to reduce weight. When trafficability permits, however, a D-7 dozer is the best tool for clearing fields of fire and constructing berms. In an existing NDP or FSB the key to maintaining a useable base is keeping a set traffic pattern, installing culverts, and constantly opening drainage ditches. Company C positioned elements in FSB Thunder I, FSB Thunder II, FSB Dominate, FSB Apollo (XT637507), and FSB Oklahoma (XT833525) almost continually throughout the quarter. In mid-December a platoon size element was sent to the Minh Thanh Airfield to establish a forward CP (FSB IRON) for 3rd Brigade.

(6) Road Upgrade and Repair: During the quarter much of the 1st Engineer Battalion's equipment and man-power assets was devoted to construction and upgrade of 81 kilometers of primary road and secondary road within the Division AO.

Company A allocated the bulk of its men and equipment assets to road upgrade and construction. One of Company A's major road projects was the construction of the Dau Tieng Bypass. Due to heavy rains during the monsoon season, the bypass road was impassable to all vehicles, including trucks. Approximately 450 loads of laterite were hauled to fill this road. The half mile road project took four days to complete. During the last week of November, Route 239 through the Michelin Rubber Plantation was upgraded. This mission called for the employment of two culverts and improvement of road. Brush was cleared from the road side using bangalore torpedoes to destroy tripwired AP mines. There were numerous secondary explosions. The roadway was filled, shaped, and crowned. The project was completed in approximately one week. Starting on 15 November 69, Company A improved LTL-14 from Dau Tieng to FSB Tennessee by filling, shaping, and crowning the roadway. The major work on this route is complete, but upgrade continues.

Company B worked extensively on a six kilometer section of LTL-16 from Claymore Corners to FSB Normandy III. More than 1,200 cubic yards of laterite were hauled into this area. The road was shaped, ditched, and compacted. Several culverts were constructed.

In November, Company C opened Boundary Road from QL-13 to Rt 239. Culverts were installed and an AVLB was prepared. This work in conjunction with that of Company A on Rt 239 through the Michelin, served to open a route through the heart of the Division AO from QL-13, vicinity of XT793546, to Dau Tieng. In mid-December, LTL-13 east of Chanh Thanh was opened using three AVLB bridges. Company C later replaced a culvert at XT823661 thus eliminating one AVLB site.

On 8 January 1970, a task force from C Company began work on Rt 301. Within 10 days the route was opened connecting QL-13 and LTL-16.

On 26 October, a platoon from Company D reinforced with equipment from Headquarters Company began upgrade of LTL-14 from FSB Tennessee to Ben Cat. The initial mission was to rebuild the 400 meter causeway at XT6034, install culverts at XT606347 and upgrade the section of road from coordinates XT592342 to XT614338. The causeway and culverts were completed on time and passed a tactical convoy of class 60 vehicles on 5 November 69. This section of road was subsequently upgraded to a higher standard. Explosives were used in extremely wet areas to allow standing water to drain off the roadway. The old roadway was elevated with a 12 inch lift of laterite. Secondly, it became necessary to construct a new section of road between XT648332 and XT656319 via XT649327. The old road had been completely destroyed and much of it was under water. More than 8,000 cubic yards of laterite were hauled into this two kilometer section of road. The expected date of completion was 15 December 69. On 6 December 69, the D Company platoon completed its work and returned to Lai Khe through Ben Cat. This completed the opening of a second route through Ben Cat to Dau Tieng.

(7) Riverine Operations: As in the previous quarter, Kener Ski Barges from Company E continued to support both the 2/28th Inf based at FSB Kien, and the 2/2nd Inf (Mech) based at FSB Tennessee in riverine missions. On 1 December 69, the riverine operations were consolidated under 2/28th Inf and all operations were out of FSB Tennessee. The Kenner Ski Barges (Ski Boat) is a 21 foot, fiber glass boat with dual forty horsepower outboard motors.

The boats operate in groups of four with five or six infantryman and two engineers in each boat. Their mission is to patrol 45 kilometers of the Saigon River between Dau Tieng and FSB Tennessee during daylight hours searching for signs of enemy activities and enemy bunkers. At night they are used to set ambushes along the river to prevent enemy movement along or across the river.

The riverine operations have been very successful. They have accounted for 60 enemy KIA as well as the discovery of many enemy caches and bunker complexes. Success has been greatest at night while the boats are in ambush sites and enemy soldiers attempt to cross the river. In addition to these concrete results, intelligence reports indicate that the boat operations have been successful in slowing infiltration into the 1st Division's AO. Except for one incident the mission has encountered very little enemy resistance. On 8 November 69, the boats working with the 2/28th Inf were engaged by enemy forces using RPG and automatic weapons fire. The ambush was very effective with most of the boats being immediately disabled. Three Engineer and three Infantryman personnel were KIA and

three Engineer and eight Infantryman personnel were WIA. One "Ski Boat" was totally destroyed. Following this ambush it was decided that Navy PBA's would accompany Engineer "Ski Boats" on all missions to provide increased fire power.

On 20 January 1970, boat operations were terminated on the Saigon River. The boats were moved to Rung Sat Special Zone in the 2nd Brigade AO. Operations with 1/16th Inf began on 22 January 70. The ambush posted the first night with the "Ski Boats" killed 3 VC and sunk one sampan. The operation continues.

A three week riverine mission in support of the 1/26th Inf was initiated on 12 November 69. Two LTR pontons with dual 40 horsepower outboard motors and four Engineer operators were provided. The mission was to sweep the Song Be River north of the Song Be Bridge in support of infantry troops who patrolled the shore. Results of this mission were rather extensive for the short time of the operation with seven enemy KIA, five enemy WIA (PW), two AK-47's, one M-16 rifle, and six 60mm mortar rounds.

(8) Base Camp Construction: All Battalion units continued support of Base Camp Construction and Upgrade projects at Lai Khe, Di An, and Dau Tieng.

Company A supported tenant units at Dau Tieng Base Camp. During the first six weeks of the quarter a platoon was tasked to construct two water towers, twenty tent floors, and ten 8'x56' bunkers for the relocated 2/28th Inf Bn. During the first week of December one bunker was constructed for the MI Detachment at Dau Tieng. Also in December, one 8'x16' bunker and five 8'x56' bunkers were constructed for P&E. One grease rack was constructed for the 2/2nd Inf (Mech). One Sea Hut and one shower was constructed for the 1st Brigade LOH pilots. The radar tower belonging to 1/5th Arty was repaired. On all these projects the lack of lumber caused delays in completion.

Companies B and E supported tenant units at Di An Base Camp. The water distribution system for the Division Training Command was completed by B Company. The project involved the construction of feeder pipe system to the showers and mess hall in the Division Training Command from the main water storage tank in that area. Company B's work in the Division Standdown Center at Di An reached the final stage with the completion of the theater, road net, and privacy fence.

On 21 November 69, Company E received the mission of constructing a 20 foot bridge on Di An Base Camp to allow emergency traffic across to the perimeter road. The design called for three steel stringers but there were only two thirty foot steel beams available. In order to construct the bridge the ends of the two beams were cut off and welded together to form a third beam. With this accomplished, the beams were set and decked on 7 December 69.

In Lai Khe, Company D accomplished limited base camp construction during the last quarter but provided much technical advice and recommendations to requesting units on bunker construction. Company D did install barbed wire rakers on the security fence around the Special Security area and constructed a 20'x40' tropical building for Special Services. A security fence was constructed around the Special Services and Red Cross Girl's living quarters. When the 2nd Brigade moved to Lai Khe in mid-December, a motor pool for the 1/7th Arty was cleared and graded by D Company.

The Headquarters Company equipment section hauled hundreds of loads of laterite for various tenant units to improve drainage and provide sandbag fill.

e. Civic Action: Contributing to the 1st Division's pacification effort, the Battalion participated in many civic action projects this quarter.

In Mid-January, Company A began construction of an access road to the resettlement village near Dau Tieng. The purpose of this road was to afford easy access to this area for buffalo, ox-carts, and government vehicles. Presently the village is accessible only by foot. The project was completed on 29 January. Additionally a house for a Vietnamese family was constructed in mid-January near FSB Kien. The family's former house was destroyed during a military operation.

Company C began renovation of the road net and drainage system in Lai Khe Village on 15 December 69. To date five culverts, 80 meters of drainage canal, and one diversion channel have been constructed. Over 150 loads of laterite have been hauled to 400 meters of road, and graders have been used to widen and shape existing roadways. Close coordination with the Village Chief has been established so the local population can assist in the improvements.

A culvert was installed by Company C on Route LTL-13 on 5 December 69 replacing a makeshift log bridge. The culvert gives Vietnamese loggers easy access to the areas they work.

On 27 and 28 December 69, Company D cleared, graded, and compacted an area approximately one acre in size as site preparation for an ARVN dependent housing project at Ben Cat. Forty RF/PF families will live at this location. ARVN's has begun construction on the houses.

On 20 January 70, Company D began earthwork on a project at Ben Cat High School. The area around the school will be graded and a large area will be leveled for use as an athletic field.

The Battalion surgeon has continued Med-Caps in Xom Xoai and Long Cau Villages during the past three months. A party was given for the children of Xom Xoai Village on Thanksgiving Day in Lai Khe.

f. Training: During the quarter, training within the Battalion was primarily presented at Company level. Range Firing was conducted twice monthly with all TO&E weapons.

The line companies of the Battalion gave classes in mine detectors and mine sweep operations to 1/16th Inf Bn, 2/16th Inf Bn, 2/28th Inf Bn, and the 1/4th Cav. The 2/16th Inf was also instructed in mine sweeping techniques by actually participating in roadsweeps of Rt 240 which eventually led to the 2/16th Inf assuming the entire sweep responsibility. The 1/4th Cav was also instructed in mine warfare with emphasis placed on characteristics of Viet Cong mining techniques. 2/28th Inf Bn received similar instruction before they assumed sweep responsibility for LTL-14 from FSB Tennessee to Dau Tieng. The training resulted in engineer troops being relieved from sweep responsibility allowing them to be more

gainfully employed on other engineer projects.

Training teams from the 1st Engineer Battalion are presently conducting a six week refresher training in Engineer subjects for the 5th ARVN Engineer Battalion. Training began on 29 December 69. Instructors were selected from different elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion, each being highly knowledgeable in his subject area. Recon personnel from the S-2 section teach classes in demolitions, mine detector operation, landmine warfare, and road and airfield maintenance, construction, and design. Personnel from the S-4 section teach operation and maintenance of water purification units. Battalion maintenance and heavy equipment section personnel continued to give classes and on the job training in the maintenance and operations of graders, dozers, concrete mixers, cranes, and bucket loaders. Company D provides instruction in the care and maintenance of engineer squad tools and specialized equipment. Company E provides training on outboard motor operations and maintenance. Light Tactical Raft construction, panel and timber trestle bridge construction and design. Instruction has been well received. The unit has been most cooperative in assisting instructors. Attendance has been good. The students appear interested and ask questions. The only major problem is that classes take twice the normal time due to the necessary translations. After the US instructors present each class to ARVN Officers and NCO's, the Vietnamese teach the class to their own EM with the US instructors monitoring.

2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATION, EVALUATION, & RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. PERSONNEL: None

b. INTELLIGENCE:

(1) OBSERVATION: During mine sweep operations on Thunder Road north of Thunder III between east-west grid lines XT70 and XT72, twelve mines were found during the period 15-20 December 69. Two incidents of vehicular detonation during this period necessitated a change of mine sweep procedures to insure a cleared road. The mines found were generally twenty pound TNT mines, twelve inches in diameter with three pronged detonators screwed into the detonator wells on the mines. These mines were placed within a one hundred meter stretch of road in sets of three. Each mine in the set was covered with numerous layers of acetate to provide a shield from the detectors. Generally the first two mines were covered with from six to ten layers of acetate and placed so that the mine sweep team came to them first. The third was usually covered with only two layers of acetate. Most mines were placed in the road or on the shoulders where the road narrows. The type of TNT used was generally of poor quality as demonstrated by the crater size when the mine was blown in place. Most mines were found visually rather than by detector due to the method of emplacement and the failure of the enemy to properly police the area of the small round containers in which the fuzes were packaged.

EVALUATION: The triple mining technique utilizing acetate shields as a preventive measure against detection by mine detectors utilizing the magnetometer principle is potentially extremely effective. The acetate acts like an insulator between the sensors of the detector and the metallic mine casing, effectively reducing the signal picked up by the operator. The length of the sweep, shortage of personnel, and time requirements precluded a minute and detailed sweep of the entire seven and one-half kilometers of road.

The failure of the enemy to adequately camouflage the mines and police the area of detonator containers was a prime aid in locating mines on the road. However, many of the mines were skillfully emplaced and after finding one mine in the ground the others were located only after a diligent search of the area already swept.

The triple mining technique seems to be used only in one area in the 1st Division AO and seems to be a more sophisticated extension of the double mine technique commonly found. However, this is the first time acetate has been used to dampen the signal the operator hears.

RECOMMENDATIONS: When the triple mining system with acetate shields is suspected or confirmed in an area the sweep team should check its forward movement and carefully check one hundred meters along the road in both directions. It has been standard procedure to check for a second mine, but the check is usually only made within the immediate area. This should be changed. All precautions for the immediate safety of the team as set forth in 1st Inf Div SOP and in particular distances between elements, placement of security, and probing should be strictly adhered to.

(2) OBSERVATION: On 2 January 1970, the 2/18th Inf. was involved in an air insertion into the location for their new FSB-NDP now called FSB Colorado. Air reconnaissance of the area showed it to be an old Rome Flow cut. The entrance road to FSB Colorado was also the subject of ground and aerial reconnaissance, but only an aerial recon was completed. Each occasion the aerial reconnaissance showed what appeared to be a good location in the Rome Flow cut for an FSB-NDP and showed the road to be passable. However, once the operation had begun and the troops were on the ground, it was found that the area selected for this FSB-NDP was deeply covered with brush and fallen trees ranging in size from several inches to several feet in diameter which reduced visibility to about twenty feet and seriously hampered ground movement and security.

EVALUATION: The effectiveness of all units engaged in the security of or the construction of this FSB-NDP was seriously hampered by having a lack of engineer support available which could cope with the situation as found on insertion. The initial confusion and the slow initial phase of clearing was due primarily to basing requirements for engineer support on aerial reconnaissance alone. Aerial reconnaissance, although an excellent tool to use initially, should not be considered as a replacement for a ground reconnaissance. Particularly with respect to engineer work estimates, ground reconnaissance is essential to determine the exact type and quantity of engineer equipment required. Little topo relief is evident from aerial recons. But ground reconnaissance will prevent major judgment errors with respect to the height and depth of objects and terrain.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that ground reconnaissance be considered an essential supplement to aerial reconnaissance for determining the location of field bases and the engineer support requirements in areas where no prior information is available.

c. OPERATIONS:

(1) Rome Flow Operations:

OBSERVATION: Using Rome Flows as tactical offensive weapons can result in a high deadline rate and excessive operator fatigue.

EVALUATION: The new concept of Rome Flows in the attack has greatly reduced the quantity and quality of mandatory maintenance. Rome Flow acreage cut is down because of the plows being used as tactical offensive weapons. Cuts were made in strips and patterns through the jungle around suspected enemy concentrations and base camps. This allowed the supported unit to move behind the plows to conduct cordons and sweeps of the suspected enemy locations. This type of movement also makes it extremely difficult and sometimes impossible for the maintenance train to keep up, particularly if it is carried on wheeled vehicles. Also on three different occasions the plows "walked" 17 kilometers on hard surface roads to exploit enemy contacts. All these factors showed when, during a period of one month, five of the six tractors were worn out and had to be turned in to be repaired.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Units supporting Rome Flows should be advised that the tractors are pieces of engineer equipment which require a minimum of two hours of maintenance daily. Without this maintenance the plows became inefficient and their down time increases drastically.

## (2) Riverine Operations:

(a) OBSERVATIONS: When conducting riverine operations with small boats there are several formations which are effective for setting up night river ambushes.

EVALUATION: Two different formations (Inclosure 1) are used by boats to set up night ambushes. First, when a river has a lot of bends and curves in it, four boats can be docked in a bend with two facing upstream and two facing downstream. Their kill zones are in the direction that they are facing. Infantrymen are positioned 10-15 meters beside and behind the boats on the shore to guard against a surprise attack from the rear, and a mechanical AP is set up on the opposite shore to prevent attack from that point. This formation provides good coverage over a large area of the river and at the same time provides a large group of people at one location for security. The second method used on river operations is to have the boats set up individual ambushes from 50-100 meters apart. Flank security is put out from each boat and all the boats remain close enough to mutually support each other. Usually eight to ten boats work in this type of ambush. The complete formation covers from 500-1,000 meters. In this formation the kill zone is approximately sixty degrees to the front of each boat. The main advantage of the second formation is the length of river over which the boats have tactical control. In the first formation when enemy soldiers attempt to cross at the far end of the killing zone, there is a good chance of their getting away, but, when in the second formation the enemy is more likely to be caught between the boats.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That these two ambush formations be used as standing operating procedures when initiating small boat riverine operations.

(b) OBSERVATION: In small boat operations, the distances between boats and the necessity for quick reaction in emergency situations make good communication between boats essential.

EVALUATION: Boats usually move in groups of four along the river with up to 100 meters separating them. In order to react properly to directions from the lead boat, two methods of communications have been developed. Each boat has a PRC-25 radio through which it maintains contact with the other boats. If the radio should fail to work, all personnel are familiar with a set of hand signals which can be used to direct the boats. All personnel operating boats must be familiar with these hand signals and be able to react properly to them. The hand signals are described in Inclosure 2.

RECOMMENDATIONS: No fewer than two means of communications be used to control small boat operations.

(c) OBSERVATION: There are many general rules of operation, action, and safety that all personnel engaged in small boat riverine operations should be familiar with.

EVALUATION: Three different checklists have been developed from experience and are provided for personnel working in boats. The first is an operators checklist (Inclosure 3); the second is a Senior Infantryman's checklist (Inclosure 4); and the third is for all personnel riding in the boats (Inclosure 5).



These are general outlines of important steps that must be taken to insure that the boats operate safely and personnel on river operations understand their duties.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That all personnel engaged in riverine operations with small boats be familiar with and use these checklists.

(d) OBSERVATION: Resupply and rotation of personnel operating with small boats in riverine operations should be accomplished from different locations each day.

EVALUATION: "Ski Boats" are operated on a continuous basis. It is necessary to rotate the personnel operating these boats and to daily resupply them. Resupply should be accomplished at different locations each day to prevent the enemy from mining the docking areas. Additionally, rotating the resupply site prevents the boats from establishing a pattern of movement each day to an established location.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That resupply and rotation of personnel be accomplished at various sites instead of one set location.

(e) OBSERVATION: Two formations are effective for use in river patrols with small boats.

EVALUATION: When rapid movement is desired, the boats line up in single file with 75-100 meters between them. For slow search movement, the boats form two columns, one on each bank of the river and maintain 60-75 meters between boats. Further description of these formations are given in Inclosure 6.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the formations described be used for river patrol operations.

(f) OBSERVATION: When small boats have contact with the enemy it is necessary that a pre-arranged procedure be vigorously executed to reduce reaction time to the absolute minimum.

EVALUATION: In ambushes of patrols operating on land, it is important that boats do not try to run away from enemy contact. It has been found that it is a much more effective and safer maneuver to advance into the enemy fire. "Ski Boats" have M-60 machine guns mounted on the front which provides the main fire power while on patrol and it can only be utilized effectively when facing the enemy. These boats also do not have any type of armor to protect the personnel riding in them. Because of these facts the boat and all fire power should be directed directly into the contact. As soon as the boat is beached, the troops should dismount and set up a base of fire. This method of reaction is illustrated in Inclosure 7. One successful ambush was conducted by the enemy against the 1st Engineer Battalion Ski Boats while on patrol. One boat was immediately sunk by an RPG round. The occupants of two other boats suffered casualties from the small arms fire that followed the initial attack. One boat came thru the attack almost unscathed. This can be attributed directly to discipline of the boat operator. At the first burst of fire he did a hard flank turn and drove his boat full throttle into the enemy bank. The infantry scrambled ashore and were the only personnel in a position to take the enemy under fire.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** All personnel engaged in small boat operations should be briefed and drilled in this combat proven method of reacting to enemy contact.

(3) **Engineer Construction Techniques:**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Secondary growth adjacent to Routes previously cleared by Rome Flows eventually becomes dense enough to conceal ambushes.

**EVALUATION:** The hazard of secondary growth adjacent to roadways becomes more widespread with time since most main routes were Rome Flowed from one to two years ago. The use of Rome Flows to cut the secondary growth is inefficient and disc harrows are in short supply. The 1st Engineer Battalion has found that a grass cutter, the property of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, does an excellent job of cutting secondary growth including grass, bushes, and small saplings. The cutter's basic component is a heavy roller fitted with vanes. The roller bends the foliage over and the vanes chop or break it. After a few days the dead foliage can be burned off. The cutter can be drawn with a bulldozer, armored personnel carrier, or a five ton dump truck.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Investigation should be made to determine if this type of grass cutter, or one using the same roller-vane principle, can be mass produced for use by all engineer units in RVN. Photographs and detailed mechanical drawings of the cutter have been submitted to the USARV Engineer.

(b) **OBSERVATION:** In clearing large areas located in old Rome Flow cuts containing many large timbers, it is often most efficient to burn logs, thereby reducing the amount of material to be moved. However, the burning, smoldering timber often precludes the operation of bulldozers in the area for three or four days due to the risk of starting a fire on the dozer's unprotected belly with its hydraulic lines and oil seeps.

**EVALUATION:** The combat engineer vehicle has proven effective in clearing areas which have recently been burned. Most larger logs are effectively reduced in size by burning so that the CEV can manage them. With the underside completely protected by armor plate and the absence of loose hydraulic lines, the CEV can operate over smoldering timbers which present a fire hazard to the dozers. Another problem encountered in operating in smoldering areas concerns the operators vision. If both CEV driver and track commander are equipped with goggles the crew can effectively operate in smoke and dirt.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** It is recommended that a CEV be made available to any engineer units that are required to clear thick timber. The use of controlled fires to reduce burden cannot be overemphasized and in conjunction with a CEV, the areas can be adequately cleared immediately after the fire has subsided.

d. **ORGANIZATION:** None.

e. **TRAINING:**

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Engineer mine sweep teams located in semi-permanent FSB's for the purpose of opening daily the overland resupply route into the FSB is a waste of engineer effort.

EVALUATION: Engineer troops can be used to give infantry troops on-the-job training in mine sweeping techniques. All maneuver battalions have mine detectors in their TO&E. Mech Inf and Cav troops that are qualified in the use of the mine detectors greatly add to the mobility of their units alone since they do not have to wait for engineer support to become available.

RECOMMENDATIONS: All situations involving prolonged use of engineer troops as mine sweepers, should be analyzed to determine if the engineer can be replaced by infantry sweepers. This frees engineer troops for other work that can only be accomplished by engineers. Two weeks of on-the-job training and supervision has been found adequate for training infantry troops to assume route mine sweep responsibility.

(2) OBSERVATION: When conducting training for ARVN units, interpreters are not always able to adequately translate technical information.

EVALUATION: The 1st Engineer Battalion has conducted training programs in engineering subjects for the 5th and the 18th ARVN Engineer Battalions. Since the interpreter has to teach the course rather than simply translate it, it is essential that the interpreter thoroughly understand the subject matter. The interpreters available had no engineer background and they had difficulty explaining technical portions of the instruction. The best method of overcoming this problem was first to have the interpreter translate the lesson plan into Vietnamese and second, rehearse the class with him. This gives the interpreter a chance to ask questions about technical items that he does not understand.

RECOMMENDATIONS: When teaching engineer subjects to ARVN troops obtain the most proficient interpreter possible. Make sure they are well drilled and understand the subject before they interpret for the actual class.

f. LOGISTICS: None.

g. COMMUNICATIONS: None.

h. MATERIAL:

OBSERVATION: Wheeled vehicles are inadequate for transporting the Rome Plows maintenance element.

EVALUATION: Recently the concept for utilization of Rome Plows has changed from area clearing to offensive clearing in support of mechanized maneuver units. This type operation prohibits the Rome Plow maintenance equipment and personnel which are provided with wheeled vehicles from traveling with the plows. On several occasions M548 "Camels" have been provided to carry the air compressor and welding set that support the Rome Plows. This gives the maintenance section the same mobility as the plow and insures continuous maintenance which is essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS: All units that use Rome Plows as offensive weapons in support of maneuver units should be provided with M-548's to carry their maintenance element.

i. OTHER: None.



FOR THE COMMANDER:

*James D. Nix*

JAMES D. NIX  
LIT, CE  
Adjutant


- 7 Incl
1. River Ambush Formation
  2. Hand Signals
  3. Operator's Checklist
  4. Senior Infantryman's Checklist
  5. Do's and Don'ts of Ski Boat Operations
  6. Formations
  7. Contact

# RIVER AMBUSH FORMATIONS



## HAND SIGNALS


- I. MOVE INTO COLUMN POSITION:  
(right arm in full circle motion  
on right side of body.)



- II. SLOW DOWN:



- III. MOVE INTO PATROL FORMATION:




- IV. SPEED UP:



- V. STOP:



- VI. MOVE TO SHORE:  
(point to landing site)



- A. Hand Signals will be used in conjunction with radio instructions.  
B. Watch for and obey the signals of your leader.  
C. Pass on signals from the lead boat to the boats behind you.

Inclosure 2 to Incl 8

### OPERATOR'S CHECKLIST

1. \_\_\_ I have completed my pre-operational check on the boat and motors. All deficiencies and shortcomings have been corrected. My gas tanks are full; I have 15 gallons of extra fuel, my motors are clean and properly secured, and my air breathers are open.
2. \_\_\_ I have briefed all personnel on safety procedures:
  - \_\_\_ a. All personnel are wearing life preservers.
  - \_\_\_ b. All weapons and valuable equipment are properly secured to the boat or to individual responsible for them.
  - \_\_\_ c. All personnel have their boots unlaced.
  - \_\_\_ d. The senior infantryman has checked all weapons.
3. \_\_\_ My assistant operator has radio communications with the engineer in charge of the boats.
4. \_\_\_ I know the arm and hand signals. My assistant operator knows them and will watch for signals in the boat in front of me and pass them to boats behind me.
5. \_\_\_ I have insured that personnel and equipment are properly loaded; even weight distribution, left to right, with as much weight as possible shifted to the rear of the boat.
6. \_\_\_ I understand and will comply with the formations procedures.
7. \_\_\_ I have read and understand the Do's and Don'ts.
8. \_\_\_ I understand the S.O.P. on immediate action during enemy contact and will maneuver my boat in accordance with the S.O.P.
9. \_\_\_ When docking; I will insure that I maneuver my boat into the dock properly and will tie my boat in accordance with the S.O.P.
10. \_\_\_ I will insure that preventive maintenance is performed on my boat and motors during a mission.
11. \_\_\_ When coming off a mission, I will perform after-operation checks on my boat and motors. I will insure that the boat and my equipment are prepared to move out on another mission prior to my departing the docks.

SENIOR INFANTRYMAN'S CHECKLIST

1. \_\_\_ I have coordinated with the boat operator and have read and understand the ski boat instructions.
2. \_\_\_ I have assigned an infantryman to operate (during movement) the M-60 Machinegun mounted in the bow of the boat. I have coordinated with my platoon leader and have established a field of fire for the machinegunner. I will insure that he keeps the weapon pointed towards the shore while in movement, and that he remains seated until enemy contact is established.
3. \_\_\_ I have insured that all weapons and valuable equipment are tied to the boat.
4. \_\_\_ I have assigned a field of fire and field of observation to all of my men. The men are all briefed on shifting their fields of fire when changing from column to patrol formation and vice versa.
5. \_\_\_ Either I, or my superior, has given an operations order to the boat crewman.
6. \_\_\_ All of my personnel are wearing life jackets and are briefed on ditching procedures.
7. \_\_\_ I have inspected all weapons on board the boat. They are on safe and the machineguns are in the half load position. When we return from the mission I will insure that all weapons are properly cleared.
8. \_\_\_ I will not permit my personnel to stand while the boat is operating.
9. \_\_\_ I have insured that the majority of the weight is distributed towards the rear of the boat and that personnel are not sitting in the bow section of the boat.
10. \_\_\_ I will maintain radio contact with my platoon leader at all times.
11. \_\_\_ I understand the boat's immediate action drill for enemy contact. I have briefed all of my personnel in their responsibilities during contact.
12. \_\_\_ I will insure that my personnel take care of their equipment, and that they will not damage or remove engineer equipment from the boat.
13. \_\_\_ I have insured that all personnel in the boat have their boots unbloused.



## DO

1. Insure that all personnel on your boat are wearing life preservers and have their boots unbloused.
2. Brief all personnel in your boat prior to departing on a mission. Tell them of our safety rules and our immediate action taken when contact is made.
3. Insure that all weapons and valuable equipment are secured to the boats with tie down cord.
4. Insure that personnel and equipment are loaded properly; even weight distribution, left to right, with as much weight as possible shifted to the rear of the boat.
5. Keep your distance while in formation. In column always remain 75 to 100 meters behind the boat in front of you, this gives you room to speed up when in trouble.
6. If you get into wake trouble, speed up; you have control with speed.
7. Keep your speed low while in patrol formation.
8. Keep a man on the radio at all times.
9. Look for, react, and pass on, hand signals from the boat in front of you.
10. Take care of your boat, your weapons and your equipment. Without it you're in trouble.
11. Keep your eyes and ears open. Be attentive to instructions given by your leader.
12. THINK! Always think ahead of the boat. Think about what's going to happen and be prepared to react properly.
13. Cover up these instructions with your poncho at night. If you don't the light may be reflected from the paper and gives away your position.

## DO NOT

1. Never ride against another boat's full wake. If you do, you will take water over your bow and sink.
2. Never make a high powered turn greater than 80 degrees. If you do, you will take water over your stern.
3. Never turn around while going full speed. If you do, your bow will take water and sink you in your own wake.
4. Never permit more than 2,000 lbs (2 engineers and 7 infantryman) in your boat.
5. Never go fast while in patrol formations. The boats behind you will get into trouble.
6. Never permit personnel to stand in your boats. Two exceptions: (a) engineer giving signals (b) machine gunner while in contact.
7. Never turn around in front of another boat.
8. Never come to a quick stop while moving fast. If you do, you will take water in your stern.
9. Never slow down in the wake of another boat or rough water. If you slow down and don't increase your speed you will sink your boat and perhaps kill a buddy.
10. Never turn around while in rough water or the wake of another boat. Never turn around while in the middle of a column or patrol formation.
11. Never pull up to another boat to assist him without first checking with your leader.
12. Never permit personnel to shift their weight to the front of the boat.

Inclosure 5 to Incl 8

## FORMATIONS

### I. COLUMN: BOATS IN FILE:




1. Used for high speed movements.
2. Maintain a distance of at least 75 meters and not more than 100 meters between boats.
3. Always follow the lead boat and keep pace with the boat in front of you.
4. To turn around in column: (a) all boats slow down with lead boat (b) lead boat turns around; all other boats following in file and turn at or past the lead boat's turn around point. STAY IN FORMATION.

### II. PATROL FORMATION:




1. Used for search and patrol missions.
2. SPEED LOW! Just above current speed.
3. NEVER turn around while in formation.
4. Keep in formation; watch your leader.
5. Keep 60 to 75 meters behind the boat in front of you.

### III. CHANGING FROM COLUMN TO PATROL FORMATION:



1. All boats slow down.
2. The two lead boats close to a distance of 60 to 75 meters and pull close to the left shore.
3. The number 3 and 4 boats pull toward the right shore and assume position just to the rear and across the river from the number 1 and 2 boats.

### IV. CHANGING FROM PATROL TO COLUMN:




1. Movement conducted at slow pace.
2. The number 1 and 2 boats slowly pull ahead of the 3 and 4 boats and begin to form a file in the middle of the stream.
3. The 3 and 4 boats follow into formation.

Inclosure 6 to Incl 8


## CONTACT

### I. WHILE IN COLUMN FORMATION:



1. All boats immediately initiate a high power 60 to 75 degree turn into the contact.
2. Only the boat receiving fire returns fire immediately.
3. Infantry dismounts and engages enemy.
4. Engineers man the M-60 mounted in the boats and provide rear security.
5. Engineers assist medic in helping the wounded.
6. Get that radio up to your ear and react to the instructions of your leaders.
7. Never fire towards another boat. Caution must be exercised to insure that you don't shoot your buddy.

### II. CONTACT WHILE IN PATROL FORMATION:



1. Boats on side of contact immediately return fire and initiate a high power 60 to 75 degree turn into the shore of contact.
2. The boats on the opposite shore of contact move full throttle ahead and turn into the shore of contact ahead of the first two boats.
3. Only the boats on the side of contact will return fire immediately.
4. Infantry dismounts and engages enemy.
5. Engineers man M-60 mounted in the boats and provide rear security.
6. Engineers assist medic in helping the wounded.
7. Get that radio up to your ear and react to the instructions of your leader.
8. Never fire towards another boat.

# CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
Office of the Chemical Officer  
APO 96345

AVDB-CM

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-  
CSFOR-65)(R2), Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

## 1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

### a. GENERAL:

(1) During the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division Chemical Section continued to exercise operational control over assigned chemical units, perform personnel detector missions, defoliation operations and employ riot control agents in support of tactical operations. LTC Herbert Jeo served as Division Chemical Officer until 11 January 1970 when CPT John C. Womack assumed the position.

(2) The 242d Chemical Detachment (CBRC) assigned to augment the Division Chemical Section, continued to monitor projects, process mission requests and perform defoliation missions in the division tactical area of interest. The detachment provided personnel for chemical operations and airborne personnel detector missions. CPT William J. Patten commanded through this reporting period.

(3) The 266th Chemical Platoon (DS) provided support for chemical operations. Particular emphasis was placed on preparing field expedient chemical munitions, ground based defoliation and burning operations. CPT William R. Diaz served as commanding officer until 10 December 1969 when CPT Thomas F. Rogers assumed command.

### b. OPERATIONS:

#### (1) Personnel Detection Missions (Bloodhound).

(a) Missions continued to be flown on a daily basis with the division air cavalry troop (Darkhorse) and division aviation battalion (Lighthorse) teams. Missions of the large area surveillance type for Division G-2 were not flown during this reporting period. Used as part of the Darkhorse and Lighthorse teams, the personnel detector provided combat intelligence which was exploited immediately with available assets of artillery, light fire teams, air strikes and troop insertions.

(b) A total of 125 missions were flown during this reporting period.

Incl 12

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
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### (2) Riot Control Agent CS:

#### (a) Non-persistent CS:

1. Six missions employing a total of 105 E-158 CS clusters were flown in UH-1 aircraft targeted against suspected enemy positions. Failure rate of munitions was negative. Twenty E158's were used in a "Mini-Mite" operation. This operation consisted of a tactical air strike, followed by the CS drop, then an artillery concentration and finally a VH by a helicopter hunter-killer team.

2. Maneuver units continued to use M-7 Series CS grenades and 40mm CS cartridges in attempt to drive personnel from hardened or covered positions and in a reconnaissance by fire role.

3. Isolated fire support bases positioned E-8 CS launchers within perimeter defensive wires. None were expended during the reporting period.

4. There were no 4.2 CS mortar rounds expended during this reporting period.

5. A total of 135 105 CS rounds were expended by artillery units during this reporting period. These munitions were used in I and I fires and mixed with HE rounds to provide a softening effect of target areas.

#### (b) Persistent CS:

1. Fifty-five-gallon CS drums were not used during this reporting period.

2. Units began using persistent CS bunker use restriction bombs (BURBS) to contaminate bunkers that could not be destroyed by explosive means and to inhibit reconstruction of those that had been destroyed. They were also used to contaminate underground hiding places discovered in homes of VC/NCA sympathizers. Over 400 BURBS were manufactured by 266th Chemical Platoon and delivered to using units. BURBS are constructed of a cardboard 2.75" rocket warhead container, fuse igniter, time fuse and blasting caps (non-electric), and filled with approximately 2 lbs of persistent CS.

### (3) Defoliation.

(a) A total of 102 C-123 aerial defoliation sorties were flown in the divisions TAOI primarily during the months of December and January. Approximately 12,000 hectares were defoliated by this means. Nearly all of this was in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone.

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(b) Nine helicopter sorties were flown by chemical personnel, primarily during November and December, defoliating 120 hectares. Criticality of helicopter blade time has reduced our ability to complete approved projects by this method. One project in the Razorback area expired before it could be completed.

(c) River based defoliation in the month of January accounted for 40 hectares of river bank defoliated. In this operation, a total of 40 kilometers of natural VC/NVA ambush sites along the Saigon River bank were defoliated with 2500 gallons of agent White. Depth of coverage was less than 10 meters. LCM's were used as prime movers, and Naval PBR's and infantry provided security. A 250 GPM pump with proportionator served as the spray apparatus.

(d) Burning of vegetation:

1. The burning of vegetation by the use of diesel fuel continued throughout the reporting period. Approximately 90,000 gallons of diesel fuel was dispersed by ground spray equipment on perimeters and in heavy foliage areas around Lai Khe and Di An base camps.

2. Burning of vegetation through use of Mechanized flame throwers reduced approximately 500 hectares of thick foliage areas S.E. of Lai Khe. This method was used in lieu of defoliants because of the near proximity of populated areas. A critical shortage of M4 thickener in the supply system caused some delay on this operation.

(e) Land clearing operations along Highway 14 included burning of heavy vegetation and large logs and stumps left after engineer equipment had swept the area. A total of 2660 gallons of diesel were used to clear an area 100 meters in depth and 20 kilometers long on each side of the highway. When an area could not be burned, diesel was sprayed on all vegetation and the engineer equipment run through the area to plow up and intermingle the diesel-soaked vegetation and earth.

(4) Flame Operations:

(a) Ninety 55-gallon fougasses were emplaced at fire support bases and an additional 20 were repaired during the reporting period.

(b) All units exchanged the portable flame throwers M7A1 for M9E1 portable flame throwers during the month of November 1969. The Chemical Section provided a mobile training team to the units to assist them in familiarization firing and maintenance of the weapon.

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1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (R2), Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

(c) The portable flame thrower XM191 (Flash) was introduced to division units by a new equipment training team (NET) during December. One gunner and one assistant gunner were trained by the NET for each weapon. Units issued the weapon for evaluation included all non-mechanized infantry battalions and the cavalry squadron. Units have not yet had the opportunity to employ this weapon tactically.

(5) Simulating Smell of Food: In early November, the Limited War Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Grounds was queried concerning the feasibility of dispensing the simulated smell of food from a helicopter. The odor of food would be used in conjunction with PSYOPS to induce hungry enemy to rally. The LWL was furnished samples of nuoc mam, a Vietnamese staple, for research. Preliminary reports from the LWL indicate the technical feasibility of dispensing food concentrates in fog oil from an XM52 (Smoky the Bear) mounted in a UH-1 helicopter. Research continues at the close of this reporting period.

### 2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations:

#### a. Water-Based Defoliation.

(1) Observations: The cost in terms of time, equipment, manpower and logistical support is high for a water-based defoliation operation, when measured against the results.

(2) Evaluation: The following are considered minimum requirements to conduct a water-based defoliation operation of any significant magnitude:

(a) Two LCM-8's or similar craft to serve as prime movers. One is used as the spraying craft and the other to assist the first in maneuvers near the river bank, to carry extra defoliant and as an emergency back-up craft. Two LCM-8 crews of five men each.

(b) Two Naval PBR's or similar craft to provide rapidly responsive security and heavy firepower. Two are required, as each covers the other as they maneuver along the banks.

(c) Two 250 GPM pumps, two water in-take hoses, four spray hoses and nozzles, one proportionator and associated attachments plus one 30 GPM pump.

(d) One S&P tractor and trailer to haul defoliant to resupply point; one wrecker, crane or forklift to load and unload defoliant from S&P.

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CSFOR-65)(R2), Division for Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

(e) One officer, one NCO and eight enlisted personnel to conduct the spraying operations.

(f) Spraying can be conducted at a rate of 20 kilometers a day, because of the speed at which the LCM-3's can travel in shallow water and the fact that spraying should be done only during high tide for maximum depth of coverage. Defoliant consumption is approximately 75 gallons (1.5 barrels) per kilometer. This seemingly excessive amount of defoliant is required because of the rate at which it is being disseminated and the fact that the percentage of total defoliant sprayed which actually reaches the river bank is a function of how near to the bank the spray craft can maneuver.

(3) Recommendation: That a water-based defoliation operation only be considered when no other method is feasible. Better coverage could be obtained in one day using a UH-1 helicopter and six man crew with a hunter-killer team as escort.

### b. Simulating Smell of Food.

(1) Observation: A requirement exists to be able to dispense the simulated smell of food from a helicopter.

(2) Evaluation: The majority of the enemy who have rallied to Allied control during this reporting period have stated that one of the primary reasons for surrendering was hunger. The odor of food dispensed from a helicopter would be used in conjunction with PSYOPS to induce hungry enemy to rally. The Limited War Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, has been experimenting with food concentrates suspended in fog oil and dispensed from the XM52, helicopter mounted, smoke generating system.

(3) Recommendation: That research continue on the feasibility of disseminating the smell of food from a helicopter. Even though the division is redeploying from Vietnam, the idea has enough merit to be considered for use by remaining USAKV forces.

*John C. Womack*

JOHN C. WOMACK

CPT, CmlC

Division Chemical Officer

## CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

CIRCULAR  
NUMBER 525-10

11 November 1969

(Expires 1 November 1970)

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Policy Guidelines Governing Combined US - PRU Operations

1. PURPOSE: This circular provides policy guidance governing combined operations between 1st Infantry Division elements and GVN Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU).
2. GENERAL:
  - a. The PRU are composed of highly motivated indigenous personnel who engage in special operations to procure and exploit information concerning the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).
  - b. The VCI is the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the People's Revolutionary Party control structure which includes a command and administrative apparatus at the national level (COSVN) and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (LHF), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level.
  - c. PRU program objectives are:
    - (1) To collect information on VCI in hamlets, villages, districts and provinces. PRU members are capable of operating agent and informant nets which provide continuous information directed toward the targeting of specific VCI.
    - (2) To plan, coordinate and execute special operations designed to neutralize VCI by capture and elimination. The first priority of a PRU operation is the capture of VCI, inasmuch as exploitable information the prisoner provides increases the opportunities for "roll-up" operations. PRU operations may take the form of raids, ambushes, sabotage or psychological operations. A quick reaction capability is an absolute necessity for the attack on VCI.
    - (3) To provide special operational assistance to RVNAF, US, and FVMAF forces, including reconnaissance and target spotting, interdiction actions and pathfinder operations, in addition to the basic PRU mission of VCI neutralization.
3. GUIDELINES FOR COMMANDERS GOVERNING 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION - PRU OPERATIONS:
  - a. Make extensive efforts to establish regular liaison with PRU and their US advisors within respective areas of operation. The 1st Infantry Division

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\*This circular supersedes 1st Inf Div LOI 21-69, 24 May 1969.

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benefits from the presence of proficient PRU within the Division TAOI. Cooperation between PRU and division unit commanders has assumed increased importance with the command emphasis placed on VCI neutralization as an essential element of pacification. PRU are capable of providing timely intelligence on a variety of subjects, and are particularly adept in specialized operations against VCI cells and individuals.

b. Effect command liaison well in advance of specific operations. Leadership of PRU is provided by a PRU team leader assisted by US advisors. In combined US - PRU operations, the US advisor will assume a stronger leadership voice than usual due to the increased need for close coordination. The U unit commander should be thoroughly familiar with the nature of the PRU and their method of operation. It is highly recommended that coordination be established in advance and on a continuing basis. The reason for this need is that often in US - PRU operations time is of the essence, and perishable intelligence will have to be exploited within a small time span. In this situation it is essential that, by prior agreement, respective missions and responsibilities be established to insure that a minimum amount of time is spent on coordination. Close cooperation and a careful delineation of command responsibilities, taking into account the responsiveness of PRU members to the team leader and the US advisor, are basic prerequisites to a combined operation of this type.

c. Utilize units within their area of expertise. Use of PRU solely as combat elements in a combined operation defeats the purpose of initiating such an operation. PRU members are well trained soldiers, but the primary factors which distinguish them from the average ARVN soldier are:

- (1) Their familiarity with the area in which they live and work.
- (2) Their ability to target VCI from intelligence sources peculiar to them.
- (3) Their unique ability to ferret out VCI from their sanctuaries.

It is necessary for division elements to capitalize on these assets if measurable progress is to be attained for the furtherance of the GVN Phuong Hoang program of VCI neutralization.


d. Familiarize your unit with the nature of the PRU and stress the need for cooperation between US troops and PRU members. PRU have pride and confidence in their ability to perform the specialized missions for which they have been trained. PRU members are to be considered as allies of equal status with US troops. Too often there is a general distrust of PRU by US troops. This distrust has no basis for existence, and significant strides could be made in overcoming this feeling if US commanders would explain the nature and capabilities of PRU to their men. One reason for the expertise which PRU have developed is the direct result of their former association, in varying degrees, with the Viet Cong. Prior to their acceptance by the PRU, an extensive background investigation is conducted on each man to firmly establish that their loyalty and allegiance are to the Republic of Vietnam. In addition, each prospective PRU member undergoes a rigorous training program of several months duration. The performance of PRU since its creation has been generally excellent, particularly among PRU located within the 1st Infantry Division

TACI. Mutual respect and trust are indispensable in mounting successful combined operations and it is a command responsibility to insure that efforts are made to engender such a relationship.

(AVDB-I)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

CIRCULAR  
NUMBER 525- 15

7 December 1969

(Expires 1 December 1970)  
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Mine/Booby Trap Dog Team and Tunnel Dog Team Employment

1. PURPOSE: This circular provides guidance for employment of the 1st Inf Div mine/booby trap dog team and the tunnel dog team.
2. APPLICABILITY: This circular applies to all commanders and staff agencies of the 1st Infantry Division.
3. GENERAL:
  - a. The mine dog has the capability of detecting various types of ordnance and ordnance components (i.e., powders, metal, plastic, etc.) by their odors. The dog can detect ordnance buried under 6 to 12 inches of soil, mines elevated up to five feet in the air, or mines located up to three feet from the side of a trail or road. In addition to detecting mines and booby traps, the dog has been trained to detect trip wires.
  - b. The tunnel dog has been trained to detect, by odor, underground excavations containing dead air space. The dog can detect excavations ranging from a partially covered hole one foot in diameter to a major tunnel complex several hundred meters in length. The tunnel dog is also capable of detecting trip wires.
  - c. These dogs can work normally from six to eight hours a day. However, their effectiveness will decline significantly if not rested frequently.
  - d. Adequate security must be provided for dog teams when they work on the point.
  - e. Prolonged marching before use will reduce a dog's effectiveness. If troops must march a long distance to the search area, the dog team should be airlifted in.
  - f. Mine and tunnel dogs are not trained to detect enemy personnel.
  - g. Mine and tunnel dogs will not be used in ambushes.
  - h. Dog handlers will be thoroughly briefed by the supported unit commander prior to a mission.
  - i. Although both dog teams have displayed a high degree of reliability

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during training, commanders are reminded that the team only supplements the normal protective measures for avoiding mines, booby traps and trip wires.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. The ACofS, G3, will process requests for employment of both the mine/booby trap dog team and the tunnel dog team.

b. Commanders will submit requests for the dog teams to G3 Operations.

c. If the request is approved and air transportation is required, unit commanders will coordinate with ACC for transportation to field locations.

d. Commanding Officer, 41st Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) will provide dogs and handlers for helicopter pick-up upon notification by G3 Operations.

5. PROCEDURES: a. Mine/booby trap dog team.

(1) The dog does not work on a leash. The distance which separates dog and handler varies with the terrain and other environmental conditions. Dogs can operate up to 100 meters from the handler in open terrain and are allowed, when terrain dictates, to work out of sight of their handlers.

(2) The dog progresses in the desired direction at a rate compatible with the immediate tactical requirement. The dog rate can be expected to average about one mile per hour.

(3) The dog detects mines and booby traps by odor and alerts the handler by sitting approximately two feet from the ordnance.

(4) The dog responds to vocal, hand-arm and whistle signals.

(5) Food is used as the primary incentive for the dog and affection is used as a supplement. If food is unavailable during combat operations, affection is used as the primary incentive.

(6) Work duration is one to two hours.

b. Tunnel dog team.

(1) The dog operates off leash within visual contact of the handler.

(2) The dog can be expected to cover one to five acres per hour depending on the terrain and tactical conditions.

(3) The dog detects tunnels by odor and alerts the handler by sitting approximately two feet from the entrance of the tunnel.

(4) The dog responds to vocal, hand-arm and whistle signals.

1st Inf Div Cir 525- 1,

(5) Food is used as the primary incentive for the dog. An additional incentive is used by showing affection during tactical operations.

(6) Work duration is one to two hours.

(AVDB-T-T)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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*for Donald H. Selby, Major*  
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20-CO, 17th MH Det

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

CIRCULAR  
NUMBER 525-16

13 December 1969

(Expires 1 December 1970)  
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Employment of Light Fire Teams and Hunter Killer Teams

1. PURPOSE: This circular establishes procedures for the proper use of Hunter Killer Teams and Light Fire Teams within the 1st Infantry Division.

2. GENERAL: a. The procedures for employment of Darkhorse and Lighthorse are outlined in 1st Infantry Division Circulars 525-7 and 525-13.

b. The Hunter Killer Teams of the Darkhorse and Lighthorse elements are structured to provide a reconnaissance and engagement capability. The armed LOH flies at tree top level over a wide expanse of terrain ferreting enemy locations. When the LOH finds and marks a target, the Cobra then engages. In addition to the obvious intention to place immediate fire upon the enemy, the Cobra also attempts to fix him in position until other elements of combat power can be brought to bear (Tac air, artillery and ground forces). The Hunter Killer Team can support troops in contact and frequently does; however, it is best suited to ferret and fix the enemy. When used to support troops in contact, the Hunter Killer Team should screen the flanks and rear of the enemy location to detect and preclude his withdrawal.

c. The Light Fire Team is designed to give close suppressive fire support to ground units in contact and to engage enemy targets of opportunity located and fixed by other means. The AH1G Cobra is not well suited for low level reconnaissance and should not be used in this role. The gunship can place accurate fire within close proximity of friendly troops and is generally more efficient than field artillery in engagement of linear targets (dikes, canal banks, berms, tree lines, etc.). However, ground troops employing gunship support must clearly mark their trace for the pilot.

3. ORGANIZATION: On a daily basis, the 1st Infantry Division has available for commitment seven Hunter Killer Teams and one Light Fire Team. Five Hunter Killer Teams are organic to D Troop, 1-4 Cav (Darkhorse) and two are organic to the Lighthorse element. The Light Fire Team is organic to Co B, 1st Avn Bn. Hunter Killer and Light Fire Teams are organized as follows:

a. Hunter Killer Team - one armed LOH (OH6A) and one Cobra gunship (AH1G).

b. Light Fire Team - two Cobra gunships (AH1G).

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4. PROCEDURES: a. Hunter Killer Team. The request for a Hunter Killer Team must be preceded by an analysis of the target to determine whether it is appropriate for commitment of this asset. If the mission is one which fits the use of a Hunter Killer Team, the request and its justification must be passed to G3 Operations. If approved, a team will be committed.

b. Light Fire Team.

(1) Approval to commit a Light Fire Team is granted by G3 Operations. Prior to requesting Light Fire Team support for either troops in contact or targets of opportunity, the targets should be engaged with artillery if within supporting range. The single Light Fire Team immediately available is on strip alert and generally can respond to a call from any sector in the division area of operations within 25 minutes. If necessary, a second Light Fire Team can be constituted by disbanding the Hunter Killer Teams of the Lighthorse contingent. However, the scarcity of Light Fire Teams makes it imperative that the decision to request this type support be made only after determining that other resources (i.e., artillery, Tac air, fire and maneuver) cannot satisfactorily perform the mission at hand.

(2) There are a number of specialized missions which require a Light Fire Team.

(a) Any medical evacuation which requires use of a forest penetrator or stokes litter must be covered by a Light Fire Team.


(b) The insertion of a LZ clearing team by CH47 and ladder must have the cover of a Light Fire Team.

(c) The movement of a convoy through an area where recently developed intelligence indicates that an ambush or harassing fire is likely should be covered by the overflight of a Light Fire Team.

(AVDB-T-D)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

CIRCULAR  
NUMBER 525-17

13 December 1969

(Expires 1 December 1970)  
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Offensive Controlled Burning of Vegetation

1. PURPOSE: This circular establishes policies and outlines procedures for controlled burning of vegetation during the dry season.
2. APPLICABILITY: This circular applies to all commanders establishing forward bases and conducting combat operations in the 1st Infantry Division AO.
3. GENERAL:
  - a. The annual dry season makes it possible to deny the enemy both the cover and concealment offered by deadfall and live vegetation throughout the AO. All Rome plow cuts made during the rainy season should be burned off as soon as the areas are dry enough for sustained, progressive burning. This will improve the movement of mechanized forces using the plow cuts and will deny the enemy the concealment of secondary growth.
  - b. Many areas which were Rome plowed and cleared of deadfall during 1967 and 1968 are now covered with secondary growth. Such tracts should be prepared and burned off as soon as practicable; otherwise, they will soon offer the enemy sufficient concealment to reestablish base camps in the area. The land cleared areas on both sides of Highway 13 offer an excellent example of the recurring need to remove secondary growth. These areas were Rome plowed and cleared of deadfall during the period November 1967 - January 1968. Now, at the end of the 1969 rainy season, the areas are covered with sufficient tall grass and scrub brush to conceal an ambush force.
  - c. Many areas of uncleared jungle are known to be habitually used by the enemy for both base camps and way stations. Such areas may, in many instances, be reduced by controlled burning.
  - d. The defense of Big Red One fire bases and forward attack bases may be enhanced during the dry season by using controlled burning to extend fields of fire, as well as to minimize the vulnerability of these bases to enemy initiated incendiaries.
  - e. The nipa palm and other growth along the banks of rivers and streams present the enemy an ideal location for placement of antipersonnel mines and ambushes. Because of its proximity to water, this growth remains lush throughout the year. Although burning it presents some problems, it should receive

the same emphasis as other target areas.

f. There are a number of areas within the 1st Infantry Division area of operations where wild rice grows in abundance. These crops must be destroyed before the enemy can harvest them. Again, controlled burning is an effective way to accomplish the task.

g. The benefits of the tactical application of controlled burning may be reaped and the hazards avoided only through meticulous planning and close command supervision.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: Each commander is responsible for selecting areas to be burned within his area of operations and for preparing a written SOP governing the burning operations. All personnel will be thoroughly familiar with procedures to be followed and potential hazards prior to initiation of these operations.

5. PROCEDURES: a. Although the rainy season ends in late November, residual moisture in the vegetation will preclude achieving best results until approximately one month of the dry season has elapsed. Areas to be burned must be carefully prepared prior to ignition. Methods of preparation vary with the fuels available and the burning technique to be followed.

b. If diesel fuel is available in sufficient quantity, the relative aridity of the area to be burned is of little consequence. The fuel may be dispensed over the terrain and ignited immediately. However, if diesel fuel is not available and the tract to be burned is not dry enough to permit sustained conflagration, a herbicide may be sprayed over the area, provided an approved defoliation project has been acquired in accordance with 1st Inf Div Reg 525-10 (C). Any one of a wide variety of herbicides may be used. Once the area has been sprayed, a two week period must follow prior to ignition. During the latter stages of the dry season the use of herbicide should not be necessary.

c. The following methods for dispensing herbicides are readily available from Big Red One resources:

- (1) M132, self-propelled flamethrowers (ZIPPO).
- (2) Hand-held flamethrowers.
- (3) Decontaminating apparatus, M12A1 (herbicides or diesel).
- (4) Several field expedients (herbicides or diesel).
  - (a) M548 tracked vehicle with 400-600 gallon capacity pod.
  - (b) M113 with a 1½ ton trailer carrying a dispensing tank and pump.

(c) The M35 2½ ton truck with a dispensing tank and pump.

(5) Helicopter dispersion of herbicide.

d. An additional method of killing the vegetation within an area selected for burning is the use of the drag chain. In this technique, a heavy chain is attached to two tracked vehicles (bulldozers, APC, tanks, M548 camels) and dragged over the area. The weight of the chain will break down the scrub growth and kill the grass. A wait of three to five days will insure that the foliage will burn readily. This method is particularly advisable whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that the area to be burned off contains booby traps or duds. The chain will detonate the devices and preclude injury to men later assigned to control the fire. (See Figure 3, Appendix 1).

e. To facilitate control of fire when tracts of jungle or Rome plow cuts are being burned, it is best to burn off no more than one acre (50 meters x 20 meters) at a time. The area to be burned should be divided into ¼ acre sections. Sectionalizing should be accomplished by clearing a fire lane 5-7 meters wide around each ¼ acre plot. (See Figure 1, Appendix A). When the plot itself is burned, troops should be stationed on the outside of the surrounding fire lane to prevent the fire from spreading beyond the desired limits. Ten men per plot should be a sufficient number; however, prevailing wind conditions can force the use of more troops for this purpose. Another method of burning secondary growth or recently Rome plowed areas is the windrow method (Figure 2, Appendix A). This is particularly useful when burning along a highway and requires fewer men for control purposes. In this operation a dozer is employed to push up several parallel berms of burnable material approximately 50 meters in length. These are then ignited and burned while the dozer moves to push up additional berms. In this technique, the dozer path should not exceed 15 meters. A longer path will deposit too much noncombustible material in the berm. Berms pushed up in Rome plowed areas should be burned immediately. If left in place they provide an excellent abatis for the enemy's use. Complete consumption of the berm should not leave sufficient residue to provide cover for the enemy. However, should the burning not be complete, the remaining material must be spread about the area by a grader or dozer.

(AVDB-T-D)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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*C.T. Selby*  
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A.G. HUME  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

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1 Appendix  
A - Figures 1-3

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FIGURE 1: 1/4 Acre Sectionalized Burning




FIGURE 1a: Section Enlargement






FIGURE 2: Windrow Burning



Appendix A to Incl 3 to Incl 13

1st Inf Div Cir 525 17

FIGURE 3: Use of Drag Chains to Prepare an Area for Controlled Burning



Area of enemy location or  
secondary growth to be burned

The use of the chain in this manner enables the commander to trace a pattern on the ground which, when ignited, will rapidly spread throughout the area - precluding the requirement to drag the chain over the entire tract to be burned.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

CIRCULAR  
NUMBER 525-18

13 December 1969

(Expires 1 December 1970)  
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Use of Scout Dog Teams

1. PURPOSE: This circular provides guidance for proper use of scout dog teams.
2. APPLICABILITY: This circular is applicable to all unit commanders and staffs of the 1st Infantry Division.
3. GENERAL:
  - a. A scout dog team is capable of providing early silent warning of the presence of enemy personnel, equipment and booby traps. The dog detects the enemy and his equipment by human odor, sight and hearing.
  - b. The dog's ability to detect the enemy depends on the wind, terrain and the strength of the scent. The dog may give an alert as close as a few meters or as much as 300 meters from the source.
  - c. The scout dog handler is a highly trained specialist (14 weeks of schooling) and an expert in his particular field. The handler works on point, and his decision and/or analysis of the dog alerts can save lives.
  - d. The scout dog team is not effective when employed with ARVN personnel.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES:
  - a. The 35th and 41st Infantry Platoons (Scout Dog) are attached to the 1st and 3d Brigades, respectively.
  - b. ACoS, G-3, will process 2d Brigade requests for scout dog teams. Scout dog teams from both scout dog platoons may be used for 2d Brigade requirements.
  - c. Unit commanders will submit air transportation requests to ACC for movement of scout dog teams to field locations.
  - d. Commanding officers, 35th and 41st Infantry Platoons (Scout Dog), will provide scout dog teams for the 2d Brigade when required.
5. PROCEDURES:
  - a. During tactical movement, the best position for the scout dog team is at the point. The dog detects the enemy principally by human odor, and should be in front of all friendly elements.

b. A covering force of two to three men will be designated to provide protection for the scout dog team. The dog handler must continuously observe, analyze and interpret the actions of the dog.

c. When the dog alerts his handler to the presence of enemy personnel or equipment, the tactical commander should determine the suspected cause of the alert from the handler. The tactical commander should then take appropriate action. If contact is imminent, the scout dog team will be deployed to the rear.

d. A scout dog team is most effective during the hours of darkness. The dog's capabilities to alert are heightened at night and can provide advanced warning of enemy movement toward night ambush locations.

e. A scout dog detects booby traps by human odor left by the enemy. If the booby trap has been in place a long time or has been submerged in water, the dog will not detect it.

f. If the dog or handler becomes a casualty, both should be evacuated. If the handler becomes a casualty and the dog becomes overly protective or aggressive to the point where his handler's life is endangered, the dog must be destroyed.

g. CS or CN gas can seriously damage the eyesight of the dog. The gas can also impair the dog's sense of smell.

h. In very hot weather and/or thick terrain, a scout dog will quickly dehydrate and can develop heat exhaustion. If the dog does not recuperate after a rest period, the scout dog team should be evacuated.

i. Depending upon the terrain and weather conditions, the scout dog is considered to be effective two to four hours on point. Scout dogs are not effective in the first hours after they have eaten.

j. Unit commanders are reminded that the scout dog team is not infallible and that normal precautionary measures must be maintained during combat operations.

6. REFERENCE: FM:20-20.

(AVDB-T-T)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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*Donald E. Hubbard, MAJ, AGC*  
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20- CO, 17th MH Det.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

CIRCULAR  
NUMBER 525-19

15 December 1969

(Expires 1 December 1970)  
MILITARY OPERATIONS

Air Assault Ambush Flights

1. PURPOSE: This circular explains the techniques of conducting the air assault ambush flight.
2. APPLICABILITY: The techniques and tactics described below apply to all areas within the 1st Infantry Division TAOR. However, the circumstances which lead to a decision to conduct air assault ambush flight operations are more likely to prevail in those areas where the enemy can easily conceal units.
3. GENERAL:
  - a. Air assault ambush flights are conducted by one or more rifle companies. Operations may be conducted using either one-half of an assault helicopter company or the entire company. They are designed to place a loose cordon around an area of known or suspected enemy occupation while concurrently inducing him to attempt to evacuate the area.
  - b. Air assault ambush flights are conducted in three phases:
    - (1) Phase I: Insertion of squad/section size ambushes along avenues of egress from selected area of enemy occupation.
    - (2) Phase II: Insertion of a platoon or company size stirring force into or near the center of the area in an effort to force the enemy to fight or evacuate the area along the avenues of egress. Phase II proceeds as if it were a major assault. Normal artillery and Tac air preparatory fires are used.
    - (3) Phase III: Extraction of the stirring force from the center of the area and inserting it near one of the cordon ambushes along an avenue of egress. Phase III takes place only if no contact is made during Phase I or II. In this event, the cordon ambushes remain in place overnight, and the stirring force becomes the reaction force for these elements.
4. TECHNIQUES:
  - a. Air assault ambush flight operations begin with selection of an area, not to exceed three km in diameter, which intelligence indicates contains an enemy element (see Appendix A). The area should have multiple

Incl 5 to Incl 13

avenues of egress along each of which there must be at least one LZ which can accommodate one lift ship.

b. A maximum of six squad or section size ambushes is inserted along these avenues to form a loose cordon around the area. Deceptive false insertions may be made in each case, and artillery/Tac air/helicopter gunship preparatory fires may or may not be used.

c. If contact develops at any of the cordon insertion points, the original mission may be altered and forces added to exploit the contact.

d. Upon insertion, the cordon ambush elements move from the LZ to their ambush positions. Mechanical ambushes will be placed around each cordon ambush position. These units will remain in position awaiting movement of the enemy, which will be stimulated by the insertion of the stirring forces.

e. The stirring force will insert with the primary mission of creating the impression of a unit which is inserted to conduct major ground reconnaissance operations in the area. In reality, all it will do is insert, following heavy preparatory fire, and conduct clover leaf patrols around its LZ.

f. Should the enemy in the area elect to remain and not immediately evacuate along the avenues of escape, the cordon ambushes will remain in position overnight. There is always a possibility that the enemy within the area will make his move under the cover of darkness, particularly when encouraged by well placed supporting fires. For this purpose, the stirring force will be moved to a position outside, but adjacent to, the cordon, from which it can most readily react to a contact at one of the cordon ambush sites.

5. PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE: a. Timely response to fresh intelligence is the key to successful air assault ambush flight operations.

b. The success of the operation depends heavily upon the amount of pre-mission planning accomplished. In addition to subtle but thorough aerial reconnaissance, extensive rehearsals should be conducted for all phases of the operation. Artillery defensive concentrations for each ambush position should be registered and confirmed during a 48 hour period prior to the actual insertion. Tying these registrations to the intelligence and interdiction program by firing random deception rounds will maintain secrecy. Among the more important facets of preparation is the final pre-mission inspection of the cordon ambush elements. If a cordon ambush fails because


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of incomplete preparation, the expenditures of aerial resources, combat power and time have been wasted.

(AVDB-T-D)

FOR THE COMMANDER:


OFFICIAL:

  
C.T. SELBY  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

A.G. HUME  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

1 Appendix  
A-Air Assault Ambush Diagram

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LEGEND:



REINFORCED SQUAD AMBUSH



LANDING ZONE

Appendix A to Incl 5 to Incl 13

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

AVDB-T-MHD

2 December 1969


SUBJECT: *Lessons Learned*: The "Shotgun" Technique of Area Saturation (U)

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(U) The attached training note is forwarded for your information and guidance.

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1 Incl  
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### "Lessons Learned: The 'Shotgun' Technique of Area Saturation (U)"

1. (U) Purpose: This training note introduces a new technique of small unit employment developed by LTC Thomas R. Finley, Commanding Officer, 1-18 Infantry.
2. (C) Background: The "Shotgun" technique developed by LTC Finley is tailored to a situation where it is possible for friendly infantry to operate at squad level due to greatly reduced enemy activity. This type of operation is especially useful in relatively pacified areas where groups of four to six enemy soldiers are attempting resupply or liaison operations. When this is the case, the infantry company can "dominate" a larger area more effectively by operating in squad-size elements.
- 3 (C) Concept of Operation:
  - a. The company is broken down into 12 ambush teams (4 per platoon) of about six men each. The company CP group and any supporting elements constitute the 13th team. The company commander retains direct control over all of his subordinate elements.
  - b. A known area of enemy movement is chosen for the company AO. This may be a trail network in the vicinity of a village or hamlet, or any other area through which the enemy is known to pass. The area should be within the fan of supporting artillery.
  - c. Aerial photos and trail overlays are prepared. After taking into consideration all available intelligence data, 13 ambush locations and 13 LZ are selected. Whenever possible, each LZ should be 50-100 meters from its matching ambush location. The ambush locations should be approximately 1000 meters apart; close enough so that one unit can reinforce another, but far enough away so that one ambush does not interfere or block the fires of another. Possible directions of enemy movement, routes of reinforcement and the possibility of artillery support should also be considered. Inclosure 1 contains a schematic diagram of the ambush system utilized by A Company, 1-18 Infantry.
  - d. The concept was first implemented by A/1-18 in early November 1969. After the above procedures were carried out, the company commander assigned four ambush sites to each of his platoon leaders. Each ambush team was given an overlay and an aerial photo of their ambush and LZ sites. With

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these items and the use of a sand table, the team members were familiarized with their future area of operations. In addition, the teams were briefed extensively on procedural matters and the importance of camouflage and concealment.

4. (C) Team Organization: Each platoon formed four teams. Two teams had one machinegun each; one carried a 90mm RR with AP rounds; and the fourth contained the platoon CP. The 13th team was made up of an eight-man company HQ group and two six-man 81mm mortar teams, for a total of 20 personnel. Each team carried a radio, and one man in each group was given supplementary medical training and extra medical supplies. Since the company intended to operate in the field for three consecutive days without resupply, each man carried a three-day supply of C-rations and each team carried on five-gallon water can. In addition, each man carried two claymores, LAW, extra handgrenades and ammunition. The mortar teams carried two 81mm tubes, 50 illumination and 20 HE rounds.

5. (C) Insertions: a. After detailed planning, the insertions were successfully accomplished. There was no area preparation and for approximately one hour (0830-0930) three utility helicopters shuttled the teams to 13 different LZ. Each LZ was successively marked with smoke by the battalion commander, who remained on station in a light observation helicopter. Lighthorse helicopter gunships were also overhead in case an unexpected contact was made.

b. Upon landing each team quickly preceeded to its ambush location, conducted a brief reconnaissance of the surrounding area and chose their precise ambush location. Here they would remain for the next three nights.

6. (C) Communications: In order to provide each team with a PRC-25, additional radio sets were obtained from another 1-18 company temporarily standing down. This enabled each subordinate team to report to its platoon leader by radio, who in turn reported to the company commander. The company commander monitored his company net and made regular reports to the battalion TOC at FSB Normandy III.

7. (C) Fire Support: The company CP with the mortar teams was located near the center of the ambush system, where it could support each team. Some 81mm deftars were fired within the ambush area and 105/155 deftars had already been plotted outside of the ambush network.

8. (C) Operations: a. Each team implaced at least one claymore ambush and two members of each team were always on guard. If contact was made, the teams could count on either mortar or artillery support if necessary, or reinforcements from an adjacent team. Illumination from the 81mm mortars was available on request. Should a team's position be compromised in any way, the company commander could reposition them elsewhere on the trail network.

b. The teams remained in their locations for three days and nights. At the end of the third night, the company was reunited and proceeded back to Normandy III. For three consecutive days, one infantry company successfully denied approximately 12 sq km of contested terrain to the enemy. As the enemy operates in increasingly small groups to evade Allied forces, similar "Shotgun" operations and appropriate local variations should become more prevalent.

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9. (C) Observations: Currently, "Shotgun" operations are being continued and undergoing further evaluation and refinement. Some useful observations are noted below.

a. Troops initially tend to carry too much material to the field. The amount of equipment and supplies carried would have to be reduced if the distance from the LZ to the ambush location was significantly increased.

b. Snipers and night observation devices are especially effective in shotgun operations.

c. Additional water supplies were obtained by collecting rain water in ponchos. In the coming dry months, an additional five gallons per team will have to be carried.

d. Helicopter pilots are not familiar with this method of operation and a thorough briefing must be coordinated as early as possible.


e. In addition to denying access to the enemy, the operation places great responsibility upon the small unit leader and has resulted in identifying the strong as well as the weak leaders within the companies. It also increases self-confidence and helps train the individual soldier in patrol, ambush and search techniques through practical experiences. Morale has risen as the small unit self-confidence builds.

1 Incl  
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Incl 1: A0 Antelope V



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Incl 1 to Incl 1 to Incl 14.

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AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Automatic Mechanical Ambush ORLL

1. GENERAL CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT: In the 1st Infantry Division, mechanical ambushes are positioned on trails and/or in areas of suspected enemy activity that cannot be covered entirely by conventional ambushes. In this way, the mechanical ambush compliments a conventional ambush by increasing the coverage of a selected area. The mechanical ambush is also used to secure the flank or rear of a conventional ambush position.

2. DEVICES USED: The devices used are all in the supply system or can be easily fabricated.

a. The components of the ambush are:


- (1) one or more claymore mines.
- (2) power source.
- (3) triggering device.
- (4) demolition cord.

b. Three types of triggering devices are used in the 1st Inf Div.

- (1) clothes pin.
- (2) rat trap.
- (3) sliding wire.

Advantages, disadvantages set up procedures and sketches of these devices are at Inclosures 1 thru 4.

3. TECHNIQUES FOR EMPLOYMENT: a. Mechanical ambushes are usually employed along enemy trails. The claymores can be placed in trees or in daisy chains along a trail. When two daisy chains are employed, a gap of 10-15 meters should be left between the two trip wires.



VC moving in either direction will then be in one of the two kill zones when the point man activates the daisy chain.

Incl 15

AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Automatic Mechanical Ambush ORLL

b. Mechanical ambushes are usually positioned in the afternoon or evening by a patrol that will be ambushing within one kilometer of the mechanical ambush. Another method is to insert a patrol from the Aerorifle platoon to position one or more mechanical ambushes and then be extracted. The same patrol returns the next morning to check the kill zone and retrieve the ambushes if necessary.

4. SAFETY: The mechanical ambush power source (PRC-25 batteries or BA-200) should be controlled by the positioning patrol leader. The patrol leader should place the power source on a flank of the claymore(s) with a distance between power source and claymore(s) that exceeds the maximum range of the claymore. The patrol leader should not wire the claymore wire to the wire terminals until he has made sure that all of his men are beyond the maximum range of the claymore(s). The patrol leader who retrieves the mechanical ambush should be the same patrol leader who positioned it. (See Inclosures 2, 3 and 4).

5. METHODS OF OBSERVATION AND MONITORING: Generally the mechanical ambushes are monitored by sound. When a position detonates in daylight a patrol checks the results as soon as practical. If the position detonates at night a patrol checks the results at first light. If available, a helicopter is used to check the area prior to arrival of the patrol. Trip flares have been made an integral part of the mechanical ambush and serve to give visual notification of activation.

6. COMBAT EXAMPLES: a. If a mechanical ambush position is not covered by indirect fire the enemy will normally remove their dead from the kill zone. Kill zones which do not have indirect fire placed on them following the detonation of claymore(s), frequently will yield blood trails only. On occasion, hand grenades and M-79s have been used to keep the enemy from recovering their dead from the kill zone. The kill zone search should be far reaching. In several instances wounded enemy have been found several hundred meters from the kill zone.

b. The results of 1st Inf Div mechanical ambushes are:

	Total Killed in Div TAOR	Killed by Mech AP's	% Killed by Mech AP's
Oct 69	375	12	3
Nov 69	363	33	9
Dec 69	376	62	16.5
1-27 Jan	282	43	15

The number of enemy dead found in the kill zone has usually been one or two.

7. COUNTER MEASURES: The enemy normally disassembles a mechanical ambush if they discover one. They may, however, booby trap it or establish their own ambush in the near vicinity, to inflict casualties on the recovery patrol.

AVDB-T-5

SUBJECT: Automatic Mechanical Ambush ORLL

The patrol recovering mechanical ambushes should assume that the mechanical ambushes have been discovered. The move to the area of the ambushes should be secure and cautious. Further, the recovery team should search carefully for trip wires or any other booby trap indicators as they approach the source of power, disconnect the claymore wires and recover the claymores. Additionally, mechanical ambushes may be booby trapped to prevent the enemy from tampering with them.

8. All elements of the mechanical ambushes must be camouflaged for maximum effectiveness. White Detcord is difficult to camouflage and requires extra effort; the camouflage sleeve issued with fragma cord works well.

5 Incl

1. Mech Ambush Using  
Rat Trap Ambush
2. Mech Ambush Using  
Sliding Wire Device
3. Mech Ambush Using  
Clothes Pin Firing Device
4. M-16 Cartridge Clip  
Firing Device
5. Power Sources

///

AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting Up and Recoving the Mechanical Ambush Using the Rat Trap Device

1. SETTING UP:

Step #1: Position the rat trap taking advantage of natural camouflage and making sure the trip wire will work properly.

Step #2: Install trip wire. One man will arm the trap and hold the action while another adjusts the wire across the trail.

Step #3: Run the battery end of the claymore wire back to the position the battery will be located. Leave the ends of the wire twisted together. DO NOT CONNECT THE BATTERY AT THIS TIME.

Step #4: Position the claymore insuring that it is sighted and camouflaged.

Step #5: Before fusing the claymore inspect the camouflage in the area of the trap, the claymore wire to the claymore and the claymore itself. If all is satisfactory THEN fuse the claymore.

Step #6: Move back to the battery end of the claymore wire. If the power source is a BA-200 battery wire directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used expose the wires and hook directly to them.

Step #7: Place battery in plastic bag and camouflage the position.

2. RECOVERING:

Step #1: After carefully inspecting the area around the battery the wires should be removed from the battery and twisted together. ALWAYS UNHOOK THE BATTERY AS THE FIRST STEP.

Step #2: Move forward and carefully inspect the area around the claymore and then defuse it. Put the claymore in its carrier. Leave the blasting cap in place.

Step #3: Release the tension on the trap.

Step #4: Take the trip wire down.

Step #5: Retrieve the trap.

Step #6: Pick up the claymore wire.

Inclosure 1 to Incl 15

AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Rat Trap Device

3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: a. When connecting the claymore wire to the battery the individual should have an obstacle between himself and the claymore. If this is not possible then the prone position should be assumed prior to making the connection.

b. The power source ends of the claymore wire should be twisted together to short the wire until such time as the connection with the power source is made. This will prevent static electricity from setting the claymore off prematurely.

c. Proper camouflage techniques must be followed in order to prevent detection by the enemy. This applies to all parts of the device.

d. An extremely accurate map location and sketch must be made as well as noting any landmarks in the area which will help locate the area.


e. The direction the claymore is pointing must be determined. (Use a compass).

f. A route out of the area and back into the area should be predetermined.

g. The team which installs the mechanical ambush should take it down.

4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER SEQUENCE AND PROCEUDRE ARE ALWAYS USED.

Tab A to Incl 1 Firing Device Type A (Rat Trap Device)



Tab A to Incl 1 to Incl 15

**AVEN-T-T**

**SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Sliding Wire Firing Device**

**1. SETTING UP:**

**Step #1:** Select spot and put in anchor stake making sure the wire is facing the right way and there is as much natural camouflage as possible for the device.

**Step #2:** Set a small stick in trip wire end of sliding wire device. Make sure the wire loops have about two inches of overlap.

**Step #3:** Anchor the trip wire across trail.

**Step #4:** Run the battery end of the claymore wire back to the point where the battery will be located. Leave the wires twisted together. **DO NOT CONNECT THE BATTERY AT THIS TIME.**

**Step #5:** Position the claymore insuring that it is sighted and camouflaged.

**Step #6:** Before fusing the claymore inspect the camouflage on the stake, claymore wire to the claymore, and the claymore itself. If all is satisfactory **THEN** fuse the claymore.

**Step #7:** Move back to the battery end of the claymore wire. If the power source is a BA-200 battery wire directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used expose the wires and hook directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used, expose the wires and hook directly to them.

**Step #8:** Place battery in plastic bag and camouflage the position.

**2. RECOVERING:**

**Step #1:** After carefully inspecting the area around the battery the wires should be removed from the battery and twisted together. **ALWAYS UNHOOK THE BATTERY AS THE FIRST STEP.**

**Step #2:** Move forward and carefully inspect the area around the claymore and then defuse it. Put the claymore in its carrier. Leave the blasting cap in place.

**Step #3:** Take the trip wire down.

**Step #4:** Retrieve the sliding wire device.

**Step #5:** Pick up the claymore wire.

**Inclosure 2 to Incl 15**



AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting Up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Sliding Wire Firing Device

3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. When connecting the claymore wire to the battery the individual should have an obstacle between himself and the claymore. If this is not possible then the prone position should be assumed prior to making the connection.

b. The power source ends of the claymore wire should be twisted together to short the wire until such time as the connection with the power source is made. This will prevent static electricity from setting the claymore off prematurely.

c. Proper camouflage techniques must be followed in order to prevent detection by the enemy. This applies to all parts of the device.

d. An extremely accurate map location and sketch must be made as well as noting any landmarks in the area which will help locate the device.


e. The direction the claymore is pointing must be determined. (Use a compass).

f. A route out of the area and back into the area should be pre-determined.

g. The team which installs the mechanical ambush should take it down.

4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER SEQUENCE AND PROCEDURE ARE ALWAYS USED.

Tab A to Incl 2 Firing Device Type B (Sliding Wire Device)



AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting Up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Clothes Pin Firing Device

1. SETTING UP:

Step #1: Select spot and put in anchor stake making sure the clothes pin is facing the right way and there is as much natural camouflage as possible for the stake.

Step #2: Install trip wire. This consists of installing spacer and anchoring the trip wire across trail.

Step #3: Run the battery end of the claymore wire back to the point where the battery will be located. Leave the wires twisted together. DO NOT CONNECT THE BATTERY AT THIS TIME.

Step #4: Position the claymore insuring that it is sighted and camouflaged.

Step #5: Before fusing the claymore inspect the camouflage on the stake, claymore wire to the claymore, and the claymore itself. If all is satisfactory THEN fuse the claymore.

Step #6: Move back to the battery end of the claymore wire. If the power source is a BA-200 battery wire directly to the terminals. If a PRC-25 battery is used expose the wires and hook directly to them.

Step #7: Place battery in plastic bag and camouflage the position.

2. RECOVERING:

Step #1: After carefully inspecting the area around the battery the wires should be removed from the battery and twisted together. ALWAYS UNHOOK THE BATTERY AS THE FIRST STEP.

Step #2: Move forward and carefully inspect the area around the claymore and then defuse it. Put the claymore in its carrier. Leave the blasting cap in place.

Step #3: Take the trip wire down.

Step #4: Retrieve the stake.

Step #5: Pick up the claymore wire.

3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: a. When connecting the claymore wire to the battery the individual should have an obstacle between himself and the claymore. If this is not possible then the prone position should be assumed prior to making the connection.

Inclosure 3 to Incl 15

AVDB-T-T

SUBJECT: Steps to be Followed in Setting Up and Recovering the Mechanical Ambush Using the Clothes Pin Firing Device

b. When installing the spacer between the contacts of the clothes pin care should be taken to put the spacer in far enough to prevent the wind from dislodging it, but not so far that the trip wire would make the connection between the contacts. It would be best to cover the trip wire at the spacer with tape.

c. The power source ends of the claymore wire should be twisted together to short the wire until such time as the connection with the power source is made. This will prevent static electricity from setting the claymore off prematurely.

d. Proper camouflage techniques must be followed in order to prevent detection by the enemy. This applies to all parts of the device.

e. An extremely accurate map location and sketch must be made as well as noting any landmarks in the area which will help locate the device.



f. The direction the claymore is pointing must be determined (use a compass).

g. A route out of the area and back into the area should be predetermined.

h. The team which installs the mechanical ambush should take it down.

4. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROPER SEQUENCE AND PROCEDURE IS ALWAYS USED.

Tab A to Incl 3 Firing Device Type C (Clothes Pin)




AVD7-T-T

SUBJECT: Firing Device Fabricated from M-16 Cartridge Clips

1. Advantages: All materials available in field except rubber bands. Light weight, easy to fabricate, simple.
2. Disadvantages: The space between contacts is small. A spark could bridge the gap in wet weather. Has not been used during rainy season.
3. Materials used in M-16 Cartridge Clip Device:
  - a. 2 M-16 cartridge clips.
  - b. 1 small stick.
  - c. 1 tripwire.
  - d. 1 non-conductive spacer.
  - e. 1 battery.
  - f. 1 claymore wire.
  - g. 1 M-18A1 claymore.

Inclosure 4 to Incl 15

Tab A to Incl 4



Tab A to Incl 4 to Incl 15

AVDB-T-T

**SUBJECT: Power Sources**

1. It is recommended that a BA-200 battery be used instead of a PRC-25 battery because positive contact is guaranteed. Wires plugged into a PRC-25 battery may not make contact. If the trip wire is then pulled and not detected the recovery team may set off the device while disarming it. This is done by extracting the wires and making contact as they are extracted.
2. The BA-200 has wire terminals exposed and positive connection can be guaranteed.
3. Either power source can be weather proofed by putting it in a plastic bag or ammo box.
4. If a PRC-25 battery is used it should be broken open to expose the wires and then the connection made.

**Inclosure 5 to Incl 15**



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Security Classification

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotations must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
		2b. GROUP	
		4	
3. REPORT TITLE			
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Infantry Division			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CG, 1st Infantry Division			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
10 March 1970		126	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
A. PROJECT NO. N/A		701235	
C.		8b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			
124			

DD FORM 1473  
1 NOV 68

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